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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in wireless communications and digital electronics have en-
abled rapid development of a variety of wireless network technologies, such as
wireless LANs, home networks, multi-hop ad hoc networks, and sensor net-
works. Wireless networks, unfortunately, are vulnerable to radio jamming
attacks (in short, \jamming attacks") due to the open and shared nature of
wireless medium. In a jamming attack, an attacker injects a high level of
noise into the wireless system which signicantly reduces the signal-to-noise
ratio (SINR) and reducing the probability of successful message receptions.
Even though the spread spectrum technologies have raised the bar for the
jamming defenses, they cannot deal with insider jammers who launch the
stealthy and intelligent jamming attacks from compromised nodes. To cope
with such dangerous insider jammers, the rst and most important step is
to identify them.
In this dissertation, we consider the problem of identifying the insider
jammers. Our approach to this problem is unique: we exploit the half-duplex
nature of the attackers. Specically, a half-duplex jammer has the following
characteristics:
 It cannot send on two dierent channels simultaneously due to a non-
negligible channel switching time.
 It cannot receive on two dierent channels simultaneously due to a
non-negligible channel switching time.
 It cannot send and receive on a channel simultaneously due to a non-
negligible transmit-to-receive switching time.
Therefore, when a compromised node jams, it cannot either send or receive
any other packets. More importantly, if an honest node is observed doing a
send or receive action at the same time of the jammed packet, it can arguably
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prove that it cannot be the cause of the jammed packet. In other words, the
honest node obtains an \alibi".
Alibi is \a form of defense whereby a defendant attempts to prove that
he or she was elsewhere when the crime in question was committed". In the
context of jamming attacks, an alibi for a node is a proof showing that an
honest node could not commit a jamming action at a specic time because
it was witnessed doing a legitimate action at the same time. We focus on
exploring the alibi framework in dealing with insider jammers. We study
various properties of the framework including detection accuracy, detection
time, network availability and necessary conditions for the alibi framework
to work. We also investigate dierent designs of the alibi framework such as
sending-based alibis and receiving-based alibis and study their strengths and
weaknesses. We evaluate the alibi framework by the analysis, simulations and
MICAz experiments. To the best of our knowledge, the alibi framework is
the rst framework exploiting the half-duplex nature of the nodes to identify
insider attackers.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in wireless communications and digital electronics have en-
abled rapid development of a variety of wireless network technologies, such as
wireless LANs, home networks, multi-hop ad hoc networks, and sensor net-
works. Wireless networks, unfortunately, are vulnerable to radio jamming
attacks (in short, \jamming attacks") due to the open and shared nature of
wireless medium. In a jamming attack, an attacker injects a high level of
noise into the wireless system which signicantly reduces the signal-to-noise
ratio (SINR) and the probability of successful message receptions.
Jamming attacks are serious in several ways. First, the jamming attack is
a type of Denial-of-Service attacks (DoS). Jammed communication channels
are useless most of the time. Second, it is relatively easy to perform a jam-
ming attack. The attacker only needs a transmitter (i.e. jamming device)
powerful enough to transmit a signal to disrupt the targeted wireless com-
munication because the wireless medium is open and shared in nature. For
example, an inexpensive device able to transmit signal on 2.4Ghz is enough
to jam a 802.11b network [1, 2]. Third, it is hard to detect the jamming at-
tack (i.e. the existence of the attack) and identify/locate the attacker. The
main reason is due to the ambiguity between unintentional interference and
intentional jamming attacks [3]. Lastly, even if the jamming attack and the
attacker are detected, it is very challenging to automatically recover from
the jamming attacks [4, 5, 6]. The network needs an out-of-band means to
defense against the attacks (e.g. having a person remove the jamming device
or having the network do a spatial retreat [4]).
There are two types of jamming strategies in wireless networks [3]: proac-
tive and reactive jamming strategies. In proactive jamming strategies, at-
tackers jam channels regardless of whether there are on-going communication
activities on the channels. Typical examples of proactive jamming strategy
are continuous jamming, periodic jamming and random jamming strategy.
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The proactive jamming strategies are easy to implement but they are not
energy ecient.
In the reactive jamming attacks, in contrast, the attackers only jam the
channels when there are on-going communication activities. Typical exam-
ples are scan-and-jam (on multi-channel networks) and listen-and-jam strat-
egy (on single-channel networks). The diculty in defending against reactive
jamming strategy lies on attackers' ability to become stealthy. For example,
in a listen-and-jam strategy in a wireless LAN (WLAN), an attacker looks
for an preamble signal and immediately sends a short packet to corrupt the
body of the incoming packet. To become stealthy, it may want to jam some
(possibly important) packets and behave like other nodes for the rest of the
time. In this way, besides the fact that the attacker can do signicant damage
to the network, it also makes other honest nodes to back o more frequently
and can enjoy extra throughput when behaving honestly.
One of the most eective jamming mitigation is the spread spectrum tech-
nique. By hopping the carrier frequency or spreading the signal in time, the
wireless network can force the jammer to spend several-fold more power than
if the spread spectrum were not used [7]. In the classic spread spectrum ap-
proach, the knowledge of the spreading factor such as the hopping pattern
and the pseudo-noise chip is a common knowledge that can be obtained eas-
ily [8]. With such a knowledge, the attackers can jam the networks using
the classic spread spectrum (e.g. IEEE 802.11 [8]) very easily [2]. Therefore,
there is a strong need to make such common knowledge secret.
An obvious approach is to make the common knowledge as shared secrets
among nodes. This will force the outsider jammer, having no knowledge of
the shared secrets, to spend much more power than if the jammer knew the
shared secret[9, 10, 11]. However, this approach does not work with insider
jammers who have the knowledge of the shared secrets (e.g. via compromised
nodes in the network). Thus, there are stronger security mechanisms needed
to deal with insider jammers.
One approach to deal with insider jammers is to use multiple shared
secrets rather than just one single shared secret. In [12, 5, 13], the common
idea is to divide nodes into multiple groups and assign one unique shared
secret to each group. The assigned shared secret of a group is used to derive
the hopping-pattern for that group to the base station. If the communication
of a group is jammed, one group member must be a jammer because no nodes
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outside the group know the shared secret. By further dividing the jammed
groups into sub-groups with dierent shared secrets, the network can avoid
mitigate the jamming eect caused by the compromised shared secrets.
The other approach to deal with insider jammers is to remove the depen-
dencies on the pre-shared secret of traditional spread spectrum technologies.
Recently, researchers have been proposing spread spectrum communication
without any pre-shared secrets. Uncoordinated Frequency Hopping (UFH)
[14, 15, 16] allows two nodes that do not have any common secret to es-
tablish a secret key for future FHSS communication. Uncoordinated Direct
Sequence Spread Spectrum (UDSSS) [17] avoids jamming by randomly select-
ing a spread code sequence from a pool of code sequences. However, UDSSS
is vulnerable to reactive jamming attacks. RD-DSSS [18] also proposes a
similar technique that can be resistant to reactive jamming attacks. BBC
[19] proposes a coding approach to have jamming-resistant communication
without any prior knowledge of keys.
The major problem with the multi shared secrets and zero-shared secrets
is that either 1) the network has much lower throughput compared to the
single-shared secret approach, or 2) the network needs a special base sta-
tion that can send/receive simultaneously in all channels. Therefore, these
approaches should be used to build alternative communications under the
jamming situations. To this end, it is still most preferable to identify and
eliminate the insider jammers.
1.1 Problem Description
In this dissertation, we study the problem of identifying insider jamming at-
tacks in half-duplex wireless LAN. Specically, in an insider jamming attack,
several nodes are compromised and become the source of jamming. The goal
of the attackers is to remain undetected while maximizing possible damages
by jamming actions.
There is a fundamental dierence between jamming identication prob-
lem and jamming detection problem. The latter is concerned about how to
detect the presence of a jamming attack while the former is concerned about
how to identify which nodes are the jammers. Note that we are only con-
cerned with attacker identication. It is trivial that once the insider jammers
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are identied, they can be easily removed from the network by applying phys-
ical responses (e.g. node shutdown) or by delivering new shared secrets to
the honest nodes.
The problem of identifying insider jammers is very challenging due to the
following reasons.
 Stealthy attacks : The insider attackers can act stealthily to hide them-
selves in the system. They are assumed to use reactive jamming strate-
gies to jam packets. That means, they only jam when there is on-going
communication.
 Inside knowledge of the networks : The attackers are assumed to know
any inside knowledge of the network such as shared secrets and network
protocols.
 Multiple attackers : There might be more than one attacker in the sys-
tem. These attackers may or may not collude with each other.
 Collision vs. Jamming actions : There are no ways to dierentiate colli-
sions and jamming actions because jamming actions can be considered
as intentional collisions.
1.2 Our Approach
Our approach to identifying insider jammers is novel and unique: we exploit
the half-duplex nature of the jammers. Specically, a half-duplex jammer
has the following weaknesses:
 It cannot send on two dierent channels simultaneously due to a non-
negligible channel switching time.
 It cannot receive on two dierent channels simultaneously due to a
non-negligible channel switching time.
 It cannot send and receive on the same channel simultaneously due to
a non-negligible transmit-to-receive switching time.
We propose a novel concept called \alibi". Alibi is \a form of defense
whereby a defendant attempts to prove that he or she was elsewhere when
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the crime in question was committed". In the context of jamming attacks, an
alibi for a node is a proof showing that the node could not commit a jamming
action at a specic time because it was witnessed doing a legitimate action at
the same time. Legitimate actions can be \transmitting at a specic channel"
or \receiving a packet". An important property of alibi is that an attacker
will never be able to obtain an alibi by itself when it jams. Thus, for a
certain time period, an attacker who jams at a certain jamming rate cannot
obtain as many alibis as other nodes. To this end, it is possible to identify
the attackers in the network based on the rate at which nodes obtain alibis.
The design of the alibi framework depends on several important factors.
 Alibi denition: If alibis are based on legitimate sending actions of hon-
est nodes, referred to as sending-based alibis, we have a sending-based
alibi framework. If alibis are based on legitimate receiving actions of
honest nodes, referred to as receiving-based alibis, we have a receiving-
based alibi framework.
 Network characteristics: Several network characteristics have impor-
tant aspects on the design of alibi framework: single-/multi-channel
capability, delay characteristics of nodes including channel switching
delay and transmit-to-receive delay.
1.3 Contribution and Dissertation Outline
In this dissertation, we focus on exploring the alibi framework in dealing
with insider jammers. We study various properties of the framework in-
cluding detection accuracy, detection time and the network availability and
the necessary conditions for the alibi framework to work. We also investi-
gate dierent designs of the alibi framework such as sending-based alibis and
receiving-based alibis and study their strengths and weaknesses. To the best
of our knowledge, the alibi framework is the rst framework exploiting the
half-duplex nature of the nodes to identify insider attackers.
We will explore dierent designs of the alibi framework in this disserta-
tion. The ontology of the alibi framework is shown in Figure 1.1. The alibi
framework can be designed using sending-based alibis (S-alibi) or receiving-
based alibis (R-alibi). For S-alibis where alibis are dened over multiple
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channels, the S-alibi scheme can only be dened on multi-channel networks
only. S-alibi scheme can also deal with non-colluding and colluding attack-
ers. For R-alibis where the alibis are dened at the reception of nodes, it is
possible to design the R-alibi schemes on both single- and multi-channel that
can cope with non-colluding and colluding attackers.
Alibi
Sending-based alibi (S-alibi) Receiving-based alibi (R-alibi)
Multi-channels
Non-colluding 
attackers
Colluding 
attackers
Single-channel
Multi-channels
Non-colluding 
attackers
Colluding 
attackers
Non-colluding 
attackers
Colluding 
attackers
Figure 1.1: Alibi Ontology
The dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we give common
models and assumptions in the thesis. In Chapter 3, we give a generalized
alibi framework with several important denitions, the principle of opera-
tion, architectures, desired properties and some common techniques of any
alibi framework. In Chapter 4, we present the alibi design for multi-channel
wireless LANs in which both sending-based and receiving-based alibis are
used. Then, we present the receiving-based alibi design for single-hop ad hoc
networks in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, we further extend the receiving-based
alibi design for single-channel wireless LANs. Chapter 7 presents related
work to this dissertation. We conclude the dissertation and discuss the fu-
ture directions in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 2
MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this chapter, we give common assumptions, notations and denitions used
throughout in the thesis. Each chapter, however, may have additional as-
sumptions, notations and denitions.
2.1 Network Model
We consider a wireless LAN where each node can communicate within one
hop with a trusted base station BS. Denote N = 1; : : : ; jN j the set of nodes
in the network. Denote n = jN j the number of nodes in the network. Each
node i in the network is equipped with one half-duplex radio. That means,
 It cannot send on two dierent channels simultaneously due to a non-
negligible channel switching time cs.
 It cannot receive on two dierent channels simultaneously due to a
non-negligible channel switching time cs.
 It cannot send and receive on a channel simultaneously due to a non-
negligible transmit-to-receive switching time txrx.
We assume CRC-failed packets are still delivered to the upper layer. Each
node may have a set of (physical) channels C = fc1; c2;    ; cjCjg to switch to.
In a single-channel network, jCj = 1. In a multi-channel network, jCj > 1.
The base station BS and the nodes in N communicate over a control
channel to exchange control information. In single-channel networks, the
control channel uses the same physical channel as the data channel. In
multi-channel networks, the control channel can be either a dedicated phys-
ical channel or can be constructed via multiple (physical) channels. The
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required feature of the control channel is that it has non-zero throughput un-
der the jamming situation. The specic design of the control channel will be
discussed later in each alibi scheme.
We assume honest nodes cooperate and follow the protocol. The attack-
ers, however, can deviate arbitrarily from the protocols.
2.2 Attack model
We assume some nodes in the network are the attackers. Denote J =
fj1; j2; :::; jjJ jg the set of the jammers in the network (J  N ). Therefore,
the attackers have the same physical capabilities as other nodes. However,
the attackers have the complete control of the MAC, physical parameters of
the radio network interface. We particularly focus on the jamming attacks
done through the malicious modication of the MAC protocol and param-
eters. Specically, the attackers jam the network by intentionally sending
jamming packets on the target channels. The desirable result of a jamming
packet is to collide with a legitimate packet sent by an honest node, result-
ing in a corrupted and un-decodable packet. From the MAC point of view,
this type of jamming attacks may be considered as intentional collisions. In
contrast, collisions in wireless networks are unintentional.
The attackers are insider attackers. They are assumed to know any
security-related information of the node such as security keys. They also
know any shared secret and protocols used in the system. Therefore, the
design of the alibi framework should not rely on any shared secrets in the
network.
The attacker is assumed to use a reactive jamming strategy due to the
eectiveness of the strategy in terms of energy and stealthiness. That means,
it only jams when it knows that there is an on-going packet. There are
several ways to implement this strategy. For CSMA/CA network where
the channel access is essentially random, every packet transmission has to
start with a preamble to inform the intended receiver and other nodes in
the network about the incoming packet. Following the preamble is the body
of the packet including the MAC layer information and other application
information. By rst sensing a preamble and immediately transmitting a
short packet, an attacker can successfully jam a packet in a reactive way.
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Figure 2.1 illustrates a reactive jamming attack on the CSMA/CA network.
The same jamming strategy can denitely be applied to any other networks
as long as the attackers have the capability to sense activities on the target
channel. In case the radio of the nodes and the attackers cannot sense channel
activities, nodes will have to rely on TDMA scheduling. In such a case, the
attackers need to jam the targeted slots because they know there should be
communications during the slots.
Packet bodyPreamble
Listen
Preamble detected
Transmit a packet
Actions:
Figure 2.1: Reactive jamming attacks on CSMA/CA
The goal of the attackers is to remain undetected while maximizing the
number of jammed packets. The attackers use probabilistic reactive jamming
strategy. That means whenever an attacker j senses an on-going packet by
detecting the presence of a preamble, it will transmit a jamming packet
with probability pj. pj is called the \reactive jamming probability" and is
dened for each sending packet. This denition is dierent from traditional
jamming rate in the literature which is dened over each time slot regardless
of whether there is sending packet in that time slot. Henceforth, the term
\jamming rate" refers to \reactive jamming rate" unless explicitly specied.
2.3 Detection Model
We assume a central detection model. The central detector is placed on the
trusted node BS. Nodes will send information to the trusted node BS. Each
9
node assumes to have a shared key with the central detector BS so that it
can have a secret communication with BS.
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CHAPTER 3
GENERALIZED ALIBI FRAMEWORK
In this chapter, we present the general alibi framework including denitions,
notations and desired properties. Essentially, this is an abstract framework
and is applicable for any instance of the alibi framework.
3.1 Denitions
Alibi is \a form of defense whereby a defendant attempts to prove that he
or she was elsewhere when the crime in question was committed". In the
context of jamming attacks, an alibi for a node is a proof showing that the
node could not commit a jamming action at a specic time because it was
witnessed doing a legitimate action at the same time. Legitimate actions can
be \transmitting at a specic channel" or \receiving a packet". An important
property of alibi is that an attacker cannot get an alibi by itself when it jams
due to the limitation of the half-duplex radio.
In the alibi framework, each node may play two roles: defendant role and
witness role. A node takes on the defendant role when it does legitimate
actions to prove its honesty. The result of a defending action is a proof held
by witnesses. If proofs are combined properly, the defendant gets an alibi. A
node voluntarily plays the witness role when it observes a legitimate action
done by a defendant.
There are two types of alibis: sending-based alibis (S-alibis) and receiving-
based alibis (R-alibis). S-alibis rely on the sending actions of the defendant
while R-alibis rely on the receiving action of the defendant.
Denition 1 (Sending-based alibi (S-alibi)) A sending-based alibi for a
node shows that the defendant was observed, by several witnesses, sending an
uncorrupted packet over one time slot in one channel at the time the jamming
action took place in another channel, also observed by several other witnesses.
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S-alibi has the following advantages and disadvantages.
 Uniqueness : there can only be one node claiming a S-alibi in a channel
at a time slot. This property limits the possibility of sharing the S-alibis
among colluding attackers.
 Multi-channel : S-alibi is only possible in multi-channel networks be-
cause it requires sendind actions in dierent channels.
Denition 2 (Receiving-based alibi (R-alibi)) A receiving-based alibi for
a node shows that the defendant was receiving a packet at the time the jam-
ming action took place.
R-alibi has the following advantages and disadvantages.
 Single/Multi-channel : Besides the possibility on multi-channel net-
works like S-alibis, R-alibis can also be possible on single-channel net-
works. This is due to the possibility of multiple receptions of the packet
on a single channel.
 Transferability : An R-alibi for a node can be transferred to other nodes.
This property makes R-alibis weak against colluding attackers who may
want to share R-alibis among themselves.
3.2 Operation Principle of Alibis
The key principle in using alibis to identify insider jammers is that there has
to be signicant dierence of alibis obtained by honest nodes and attackers.
The dierence can be deterministic such as \only good nodes can obtain
alibi while attackers cannot" or statistical such as \a good node statistically
obtains higher number of alibis than an attacker". With these dierences,
as time goes on, the attackers will be eventually identied. However, if the
attackers can manage to remove the dierences, the alibi framework will fail
to dierentiate the good nodes and the attackers. Thus, it is very important
to have the right denition and implementation of alibis.
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3.3 Alibi Architecture
The architectures of the generalized alibi framework for the base station BS
and the clients i 2 N are shown in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, respectively.
Note that the architectures only show the components relevant to the alibi
framework.
MAC is a component for nodes to access the shared medium. Depending
on the type of the networks, the MAC can be CSMA/CA or TDMA.
The characteristics of the MAC component will heavily inuence the
design of the BBC-based control channel.
Monitor is a component lying above the MAC layer to monitor the channel.
It specically looks for corrupted packets and pass them to the upper
layer with the corresponding timestamps to create potential proofs.
For a client, the Monitor puts proofs into a nite queue. For the base
station, the Monitor passes proofs to the Proof Collector.
Alibi protocol at the clients is designed to receive proofs and send them
to base station.
Jamming-resistant control channel is the main communication in the
jamming situation and is built on top of the MAC component. The
specic design of the jamming-resistant control channel will be dis-
cussed further in each instance of the framework. The common char-
acteristic of the jamming-resistant control channel is that it relies on
no pre-shared secrets between communication parties and thus has low
throughput. It should be used to send control information only.
Proof Collector is the component at the base station BS only. It collects
proofs from dierent sources, combines them and generates alibis for
nodes. It also may issue the \collect-proof" command through the
jamming-resistant control channel to collect proofs from the nodes.
Alibi detector is the component at the base station only. It receives ali-
bis of each node from the Proof Collector and performs the detection
algorithm.
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3.4 Desired Properties
An alibi framework needs to have ve properties: completeness, accuracy,
detection time, availability and scalability.
 Accuracy : This property is concerned about the false alarm rate and the
detection probability. A false alarm is declared when an honest node is
falsely accused as an attacker. The detection probability is dened as
the number of true positives over the total number of identications.
 Detection time: This property is concerned about the time to identify
the attackers. Specically, any alibi-based detection algorithms must
show that the time to detect is bounded.
 Availability : This property is dened as the fraction of time network
can successful communication. Intuitively, the more the attackers jam
the channels, the less availability is and the faster the attackers get
detected. Thus, this becomes the trade-o for the attackers.
 Scalability : This property species how much overhead is incurred in
terms of storage, computation and communication overhead.
3.5 Jamming-resistant Control Channels
There are several ways to create jamming-resistant control channel on top of
the MAC layer. In this section, we present two designs of jamming-resistant
control channels. One design is based on concurrent code (BBC code) [19]
which can work on single-/multi-channel networks. The other design relies
on the uncoordinated frequency hopping (UFH) proposed in [15]. The main
reason for using these schemes is that they can work on the MAC layer
without any modications of the physical layer. There are other ways to
design jamming-resistant control channels such as UDSSS [17] and RD-DSSS
[18] that require certain modications in the physical layer.
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Figure 3.3: An example of BBC broadcast using pulses (excerpted from
[19]).
3.5.1 Jamming-resistant Control Channel using Concurrent
Code (BBC code)
BBC is a keyless jamming-resistant broadcast communication proposed in
[19]. The basic idea is to have the sender create \indelible" marks in an
additive-OR channel to convey a sending message. The receiver receives a
\packet" containing all the marks and decodes the original sending message.
Indelible marks in the additive-OR channel have an important property: the
jammers cannot erase the existence of the marks in the channel; they can
only create extra marks. Therefore, a received BBC packet may contain more
marks than those created by the senders. In other words, the set of marks
in the received BBC packet is the super-set of the marks created by senders.
Thus, the coding scheme is called concurrent code and BBC code is the only
known implementation of the concurrent code.
A message M of length n bits is encoded into a message M 0 of length
m = ne, where e is the expansion factor (e > 1). Denote (m; i) to be the
rst i bits of messagem and a hash functionH (e.g. MD5 or SHA1). For each
i 2 (1; n), we calculate the location L(i) of the i-th mark corresponding to bit
i as L(i) = H((m; i)) mod m. Therefore, the message M is encoded into
n marks whose locations are from 0::m. The encoded message M 0 will then
be transmitted in m slots. The marked slots correspond to transmissions of
a pulse (i.e. a preamble-only packet). The unmarked slot is equivalent to no
transmission. Figure 3.3 shows an example of a BBC encode and broadcast
using pulses. Message M = 1011 is padded with two 0-bits and becomes
M = 101100. An indelible mark is a radio pulse, and its location is the time
when pulse occurs relative to the start of the message. The table on the right
shows part of the denition of the hash function H(x). Each prex of the
padded message is hashed using the hash function H(x). The results of the
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hash are used as the locations of the pulse.
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Figure 3.4: Decode tree for the BBC broadcast using pulses (excerpted
from [19]).
The receiver receives a packet of length m containing at least n marks.
The packet may have more than n marks due to either multiple messages
sent or extra marks by jammers. The decoding process guarantees to decode
any messages contained in the packet. It maintains a tree of maximum depth
n rooted by an empty message. At the depth level 1, if the location at (H(0)
mod m) is marked, 0 is added into the tree. Similarly, if the location of
(H(1) mod m) is marked, 1 is added into the tree. Recursively, at each node
at level i with the corresponding message of length i Mi, if (H(Mib) mod m)
(b = 0; 1) is marked in the packet, b is added as a child of the node. The tree
keeps growing until the level n. Any nodes at level n correspond to decoded
messages of length n. Figure 3.4 shows an example of the decode tree for
the BBC broadcast using pulses. In this example, two messages 1011 and
1000, padded with two 0-bits for the checksum purpose, were broadcasted
simultaneously. The table on the right shows part of the denition of the
hash function H(x). The 3rd row at the top shows at which times a pulse
was sent (gray boxes with 1s) or not sent (white boxes with 0s). This is
essentially a bit-wise OR of the pulse pattern for each message. The binary
tree shows those prexes that are considered during decoding. A prex is
gray if its hash gives a time at which a pulse was detected. The dotted line
shows the transition from decoding the body of the message to checking the
appended checksum zeros.
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Even though the decoding process guarantees to decode any messages
contained in the packet, it also decodes extra messages, referred to as \hal-
lucination". To control the number of hallucination messages, a checksum
sequence containing l 0-bits is added into the original message. Furthermore,
to control the width of the decoding tree, s bits are inserted in every f bits
in the original message. We leave the detailed analysis of these parameters
to the original paper [19].
3.5.2 Uncoordinate Frequency Hopping (UFH)
UFH was rst proposed in [15] and was later on improved in [14, 16]. UFH
works on multi-channel networks where each node changes the communica-
tion frequency randomly in each time slot without any coordination. In this
way, nodes opportunistically communicate when they are on the same chan-
nel. The main advantage of UFH is the simplicity of the implementation.
However, its major disadvantage is the high-delay/low-throughput commu-
nication. Thus, it should be used to exchange control information only.
3.6 Alibi Identication Algorithms
This section discusses several common algorithms that can be used to dier-
entiate attackers and honest nodes based on their alibi alibi score function
over time.
3.6.1 Alibi Score Function
In the alibi framework, the central detector BS keeps track of the number
of alibis obtained by each node over time. Denote ascorer(T ) to be the
number of alibis obtained for node r 2 N over the time slot set T . At the
beginning, ascorer() is set to 0. At each time slot t 2 T , the alibi score
is updated accordingly. The nodes that have lowest alibi scores consistently
are likely to get accused. Because the alibi score is probabilistic by nature,
we need certain statistical detection algorithms to dierentiate the attackers
and the honest nodes based on their alibi scores. Thus, there will be certainly
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trade-os of the detection time and the detection accuracy. In the following
sections, we present two statistical detection algorithms.
3.6.2 Distance-based Outlier Detection Algorithms
Given a set of ascorer(T );8r 2 N in the time slot set T , we need to identify
the set of nodes with the alibi scores that are too low compared to other
nodes. Because we do not know the distribution of the alibi scores, the
outlier detection algorithm has to be non-parametric. Therefore, there will
certainly be the tradeo between the false alarm probability and correct
detection probability. In the alibi framework, we use a distance-based outlier
detection technique as follows.
Denote ;  the mean and standard deviation of ascorer(T ), respectively.
A node r is determined as outlier if its distance to the \center" (i.e., )
is larger than a pre-determined threshold . We use the Mahalanobis
squared distance calculated as d(r) = (ascorer   )2 1. Mahalanobis
squared distance d(i) is used rather than Euclidian distance because Ma-
halanobis distance normalizes the original distances into the scale-invariant
distances that can be compared to the 2 distribution. Specically, Maha-
lanobis distance has a property that the probability of d(i) > 2() is ,
where 2() is the upper (100)-th percentile of a chi-square distribution.
A node r is accused as an attacker if d(r) <  and d(r)  . The rst
condition ensures that we only accuse nodes that have alibi scores lower
than the mean . The second condition species the threshold  in which r
is accused based on its distance d(r). Intuitively, lower value of  increases
the detection probability (i.e., accusing r when r is an attacker), but also
increases the false alarm probability (i.e., accusing r when r is an honest
node). In the alibi framework,  is chosen based on the target false alarm
probability . Specically,  = 2(). For example, if the target false alarm
probability  is 0:1,  is set to 2(0:1) = 2:706.
3.6.3 Sequential Hypothesis Testing
Denote 0 = ascorer(T )=jT j to be the alibi rate of an honest r. Denote
1 = ascorej(T )=jT j to be the alibi rate of an attacker j. Intuitively, if
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0 > 1, then the honest node r obtains faster alibis than an attacker and
thus becomes dierent from the attacker. In what follows, we use sequential
hypothesis testing to determine whether a node is good or bad according to
its alibi rate.
Let us denote Yi(t) as a random process of obtaining alibis of node i. For
node i, Yi(t) = 0 if no alibi is obtained and Yi(t) = 1 if an alibi is obtained.
Let us denote H0 as the hypothesis that a node is an honest node and H1 is
the hypothesis that a node is an attacker. Therefore,
Pr[Yi(t) = 0jH0] = 1  0; P r[Yi(t) = 1jH0] = 0
Pr[Yi(t) = 0jH1] = 1  1; P r[Yi(t) = 1jH1] = 1
The likelihood ratio in an interval [0; T ] is
(Yi) =
Pr[YijH0]
Pr[YijH1] =
TY
t=0
Pr[Yi(t)jH0]
Pr[Yi(t)jH1]
, where Yi is the vector of events that node i observed in [0; T ] and
Pr[Y jHi] represents the conditional probability mass function of the event
stream Yi given that Hi is true. Yi is a random walk. The rule for the
detection relies on two thresholds 1 and 0 (1 > 0). If (Yi)  1, then
the hypothesis H0 is concluded. If (Yi)  0, then the hypothesis H1 is
concluded. If 0 < (Yi) < 1, more observations are needed to make the
conclusion.
Intuitively, 0 and 1 directly aect the false alarm probability and de-
tection probability. Let us consider false alarm probability PF and detection
probability PD. Let us denote the user-chosen values of the false alarm and
detection probability are  and , respectively. That means, PF   and
PD  . We need to nd out the relationship between ;  and 0; 1.
In [20], Wald proves that if we set 1   and 0  1 1  , then the actual
false alarm P F and detection probability P

D have following relationships: 1)
P F <


; 2) 1 P D < 1 1  and 3) 1 P D +P F  1   +. He further shows
that the expected number of samples T to conclude the hypothesis H1 is
E[T jH1] =
 ln 

+ (1  ) ln 1 
1 
1 ln
1
0
+ (1  1) ln 1 11 0
:
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CHAPTER 4
ALIBI DESIGN FOR MULTI-CHANNEL
WLANS
4.1 Overview
In this chapter, we present a design of an alibi framework for multi-channel
WLANs. The network has the set of nodesN = 1; : : : ; jN j and a trusted base
station. Nodes communicate with the base station as illustrated in Figure
4.1.
1
2
5
BS
4
3
Figure 4.1: Network Model
The network uses Time-Division Multiple Access (TDMA). The base sta-
tion delivers the TDMA schedule to the nodes over a control channel. We as-
sume the base station can send/receive in all channels simultaneously. How-
ever, we assume an abstract assignment as follows. There will be n slots
of size s in a round. Each slot is uniquely pre-assigned to a node. Honest
nodes only transmit in their assigned time slots. In the normal situation, the
TDMA scheduling has no collisions. Figure 4.2 gives an example of a TDMA
schedule on 3 channels and 6 nodes. Slots 1 and 7 are the slots for the base
station. The rest of slots is for each node i to send to the base station.
The basic idea is to exploit the limited capabilities of the jammer j: he
cannot jam two channels simultaneously. This limitation implies that if he
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Figure 4.2: Example of a TDMA scheduling for 6 nodes on 3 channels. The
number in the box denotes the sender at that time slot. B means the base
station.
jams on one channel in a time slot, he cannot jam any other channel in the
same time slot. This opens a chance for good nodes to prove their honesty.
Nodes can transmit on other channels to prove that they were transmitting on
another channel while one channel was jammed in a time slot. Such sending
proofs are referred to as sending-based alibis (s-alibis). Similarly, if a node
receives an uncorrupted packet content in one channel while there is another
jamming activity in another channel, it will get a receiving-based alibi. The
important property of alibis is that only good nodes can prove their honesty
while the jammer can never do that. Eventually, all good nodes are proved
to be honest and the jammer j is identied.
In the design of the alibi framework, sending-based alibis are used to
identify insider jammers in the uplink trac. Receiving-based alibis are
used to identify insider jammers in the downlink trac. The design of this
framework, despite of its simplicity, demonstrates the applications of sending-
based and receiving-based alibis.
4.2 S-alibis for Uplink Trac
For the up-link trac (i.e., the trac from nodes to the base station), nodes
have chances to become the defendants and the base station is the only
witness. Figure 4.3 shows an example of s-alibis for a network of 5 nodes
and 3 channels. At time slot 1, the base station detects a jammed packet at
channel 1 while receiving uncorrupted packets from node 2 and 4 on channel
2 and 3, respectively. Therefore, node 2 and 4 will get a s-alibi. Similar,
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Figure 4.3: Example of the S-alibis for up-link trac. At time slot 1, 4 and
6, there are jammed packets. Thus, nodes (2,4), (1,4) and (3,4) get s-alibis.
5 is accused as the insider jammer due to no s-alibis obtained.
for the time slots 4 and 6, nodes 1,4 and 3,4 will get a s-alibi. In this way,
whenever there is jammed packet, there will be at least some nodes getting
s-alibis. Eventually, the nodes which have the lowest number of s-alibis are
accused as the insider jammers.
4.3 R-alibis for Downlink Trac
The situation is dierent for the down-link trac (i.e., the broadcast message
from the base station to the nodes). Because the base station broadcasts
at all channels, nodes listening on the un-jammed channels will receive a
correct message while nodes listening on the jammed channels will receive
a corrupted packet. Each node keeps received packets as proofs. In a time
slot, if there are some nodes U receiving corrupted packets and some other
nodes V receiving uncorrupted broadcast message, the nodes V will receive
R-alibis.
In this way, nodes are required to send to the base station the content
of their last received broadcast message (i.e., proofs). The base station will
decide to give a R-alibi to a node based on the content of that node's last
received broadcast messages. Specically, if the received content by a node s1
matches with the content of the broadcast message and there is a corrupted
content reported by another node s2, s1 will get a R-alibi.
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Figure 4.4 gives an example of the R-alibis for down-link trac. In the
rst downlink slot, channel 1 is jammed. Nodes 1 and 2 receive an uncor-
rupted broadcast message from the base station and may get an R-alibi.
Similarly, the second and third downlink slot are jammed. Nodes 2, 3 and 3,
4 may get an R-alibi. The R-alibis are actually obtained when nodes send
the proofs back to the base station during proof-collection period.
Time slot
C
h
a
n
n
e
l 1
2
3
2
3
1
2
Uplink 
traffic
3
4
Uplink 
traffic
Proof-collection 
using BBC-based 
timing channel
R-Alibi 1, 2 2, 3 3, 4
Figure 4.4: Example of the R-alibis for down-link trac.
4.4 Alibi Protocols
For the up-link trac, the proofs are already collected by the base station.
Therefore, the network does not need to have special protocol to collect
proofs in case of the up-link trac. For the down-link trac, nodes have
to send the proofs collected from the last broadcast message to the base
station. Because the normal up-link trac may be jammed, the proofs have
to be transmitted using a low-throughput jamming-resistant communication
channel. Specically, the proof transmission period is triggered when the base
station detects a jamming attack on the down-link trac. The base station
uses a BBC-based jamming-resistant channel to broadcast a proof-collection
message to all nodes. Each node, upon receiving the proof-collection message,
will start to transmit proofs that they have collected to the base station using
the BBC-based jamming resistant channel.
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4.4.1 Jamming Detection in the Downlink Trac
To detect a jamming attack on the down-link trac, the base station counts
the number of un-acknowledged messages (referred to as the jamming counter).
When the the jamming counter exceeds a jamming threshold, the base station
declares a jamming attack. The jamming threshold is a tunable parameter.
A down-link message is marked as un-acknowledged as follows.
 If it is a uni-cast message to a node, the jamming counter is simply set
(by the base station) to the number of unicast messages that do not
get acknowledged by the destination nodes.
 If it is a multi-cast/broadcast message, the nodes receiving it, regardless
of the correctness of the received content, will piggy-back a hash of the
content in their next data packets. The jamming counter is set (by the
base station) to sum of the number of nodes reporting the un-matched
hashes of the broadcast content and the number of nodes not report-
ing the hash of the broadcast content. The former concerns about the
nodes that receive corrupted broadcast messages and can send back
the hash of the received content. The latter concerns about the nodes
that receive corrupted broadcast and cannot send back the hash of
the received content due to the up-link jamming attacks. Figure 4.5
shows an example of the jamming detection in the down-link trac.
In the example, the base station broadcasts a message m. Node 1 re-
ceives m correctly. Nodes 2, 3 and 4 receive m2;m3 and m4, which are
corrupted versions of m, respectively. All nodes attach a hash of the
content of their received broadcast messages H(m2); H(m3); H(m4) in
the next data packets they send to the base station. Upon receiving the
messages from nodes 2 and 4 which contains H(m2); H(m4), the base
station increases the jamming counter by 2 because the messages from
nodes 2 and 4 are received correctly and 2) the hashes H(m2); H(m4)
do not match withH(m). Upon receiving the message from node 1 con-
taining H(m1), the base station does not increase the jamming counter
because the message from node 1 is received correctly and the embed-
ded hash content matches with H(m). The hash reported by node 3
is not received correctly by the base station and thus does not count.
Note that if nodes 2, 3 and 4 send some messages to the base station
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and embed H(m2); H(m3); H(m4), the base station will not count them
again (i.e., nodes 2 and 4). For the node 3, it will be eventually counted
until the next broadcast message m0 because node 3 does not report
correctly what it received for the last broadcast message m.
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Figure 4.5: Example of the jamming detection in the down-link trac.
Checking symbols represent successful transmissions. Star symbols
represent corrupted transmission.
The hash function H used to hash the received content of the broadcast
message can be any hash function such as SHA1 or MD5. It is just used
to verify the integrity of the received message. Note that there is another
way to implement the jamming detection protocol. The base station can
simply attach a message integrity code (MIC) in the message m. The nodes
can verify whether they received correct broadcast messages or not. Then,
they can attach one bit result in the messages to the base station indicating
whether they received correct broadcast messages or not.
4.4.2 BBC-based Control Channel
The base station broadcasts the proof-collection message to nodes using the
BBC-based control channel (see Chapter 3). It only broadcasts this message
when it detects a jamming situation in the down-link trac. It will also
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broadcast this message in all channels. Therefore, any node, regardless of
which channels they are in, is able to receive the proof-collection message.
This ensures no nodes miss the proof-collection period.
Note that the transmission of the proof-collection message may be long
due to the low-throughput nature of the timing channel. Thus, it may last
over the up-link period. That means, nodes may not be able to have suc-
cessful transmission to the base station. However, this is just a temporary
period where the base station preempts the channel to send the important
control message.
When nodes receive the proof-collection message, they will also use BBC-
based control channel to send proofs to the base station. Specically, each
node will randomly select a channel in C on which it uses the BBC-based
timing communication to transmit proofs. Because the base station can
listen to all channels, it will be able to receive all proofs from nodes.
It is also important to emphasize that when nodes receive the proof-collection
message, they will rst estimate the start of the broadcast period and only
report the proofs before that period. This is to avoid reporting the false cor-
ruption caused by the base station broadcasting the proof-collection message.
4.5 Detectability Analysis for Uplink Trac
In the following sub-section, we are going to analyze the detectability of the
insider jammers for the uplink trac. Specically, we want to analyze the
necessary conditions that allow the alibi system to identify the attackers.
That means, if the necessary condition is not met, the system cannot make
any guarantee in identifying any attackers. Furthermore, if the necessary
condition is met, the system can promise to identify the attackers, given the
following assumptions:
 There are no channel losses. In other words, any corrupted packets are
the results of the jamming actions.
 All nodes, including compromised nodes, have non-zero sending rate.
Furthermore, nodes, including compromised nodes, are assumed to al-
ways have packets to send.
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 Whenever a jammer decides to jam at a time slot, it will jam on a
uniformly selected channel in C.
 In any time slot, two events, (a) \a particular jammer jams", and (b)
\a particular sender sends", are independent.
 Nodes, including compromised nodes, will fully utilize the slots allo-
cated for their transmission. That means, there are no \idle" allocated
transmission slots.
Theorem 1 (Identifying non-colluding attackers in the up-link trac)
In the network N with the set of non-colluding jammers J = j1; : : : ; jjJ j with
the allocated sending rates psendj1 ; : : : ; p
send
jjJ j and the jamming rates p
jam
j1
; : : : ; pjamjjJ j ,
the alibi framework can identify any jammer j (j 2 J ; pjamj > 0) if
pjamj (
b  a=jCj
a  b  
wb
1  b) > w   1
where w =
psendj
psendsmin
, psendsmin is the minimum sending rate of all nodes in N ,
a =
Y
i2Jnj
(1  p
jam
i
jCj )
and
b =
Y
i2Jnj
(1  pjami )
.
Proof :
Let us consider an honest node s 2 NnJ with sending rate psends and a
jammer j 2 J with the sending rate psendj . Let us denote pjamj the jamming
rate of jammer j (psendj +p
jam
j  1) because j cannot simultaneously jam and
send at the same time. In other words, the sending events and the jamming
events of j are mutual exclusive.
For an honest s, in any time slot, with probability psends , s will send a
packet. When s sends a packet, it will obtain s-alibi if at least one attacker
in J jams and its sending packet is not jammed. Therefore, the probability
that s obtains s-alibi in a time slot is
psends Pr[no attackers jam on a particular channel j at least one attacker jams] =
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psends  Pr[A(J )j B(J )]
where A(J ) denotes the event of \no attackers in J decides to jam on a
particular channel" , B(J ) denotes the event of \no attacker in J decides
to jam" and B(J ) denotes the event of \at least one attacker in J decides
to jam". It is easy to see that
Pr[A(J )] =
Y
i2J
(1  p
jam
i
jCj )
and
Pr[B(J )] = 1  Pr[ B(J )] =
Y
i2J
(1  pjami )
.
By using the conditional probability expansion, we have
Pr[A(J )j B(J )] = Pr[A(J ) \
B(J )]
Pr[ B(J )] =
Pr[A(J ) B(J )]
1  Pr[B(J )]
. Since B(J ) is a subset of A(J ), we have Pr[A(J ) B(J )] = Pr[A(J )] 
Pr[B(J )].
Therefore, in any time slot, s will get a s-alibi with probability
psends
Pr[A(J )]  Pr[B(J )]
1  Pr[B(J )] (4.1)
Similarly, in any time slot, with probability psendj , j will send a packet and
obtain s-alibi given that at least one attacker in J nj jams and j's packet is
transmitted successfully. By doing a similar analysis, we can derive that the
probability that j obtains s-alibi in a time slot is
psendj
Pr[A(J nj)]  Pr[B(J nj)]
1  Pr[B(J nj)] (4.2)
.
For s to obtain s-alibis faster than j, we need
psends
Pr[A(J )]  Pr[B(J )]
1  Pr[B(J )] > p
send
j
Pr[A(J nj)]  Pr[B(J nj)]
1  Pr[B(J nj)]
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. To identify j, we need to ensure the above condition for all honest nodes.
That means, we need
psendsmin
Pr[A(J )]  Pr[B(J )]
1  Pr[B(J )] > p
send
j
Pr[A(J nj)]  Pr[B(J nj)]
1  Pr[B(J nj)]
where psendsmin is the minimum sending rate of all honest nodes.
Denote a = Pr[A(J nj)], b = Pr[B(J nj)], p = pjamj , w =
psendj
psends
and
c = jCj. We have Pr[A(J )] = (1  p=c)a and Pr[B(J nj)] = (1  p)b. Thus,
the above condition becomes
(1  p=c)a  (1  p)b
1  (1  p)b > w
a  b
1  b
. By expanding the above inequality, we obtain
a  p
c
a  b+ pb  ba+ p
c
ba+ b2  pb2 > wa wab+wpab wb+wb2 wpb2
. After some manipulations, we get
p((1  b)(b  a
c
)  wb(a  b)) > (a  b)(1  b)(w   1)
. Divide both sides by the term (a  b)(1  b), we have
p(
b  a=c
a  b  
wb
1  b) > w   1
.

The dierence for the case of colluding attackers is that they can coordi-
nate with each other to avoid overlapping jamming in any channel. Speci-
cally, they coordinate as follows. In any time slot, if an attacker decides to
jam, it will jam on the channel that 1) does not have any other attackers
jamming on and 2) does not have any other attackers sending on.
Theorem 2 (Identifying colluding attackers in the up-link trac) In
the network N with the set of non-colluding jammers J = j1; : : : ; jjJ j with
the sending rates psendj1 ; : : : ; p
send
jjJ j and the jamming rates p
jam
j1
,. . . , pjamjjJ j , the
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alibi framework can identify any jammer j (j 2 J ) if
psendsmin
a  b
1  b > (1  p
jam
j )  b
where psendsmin is the minimum sending rate of all honest nodes in N ,
a =
jCj   jJ j
jCj  Pi2J (1  pjami )
and
b =
Y
i2J
(1  pjami )
even under the best jamming rates of the attackers where pjamj1 = 1 psendj1 ; : : : ; pjamjjJ j =
1  psendjjJ j .
Proof :
From the coordination strategy above, it is intuitive to see that in any
time slot, if one attacker decides to jam, it is best for all other non-sending
attackers also decide to jam. This is because if a non-sending attackers does
not jam when at least another attacker jams, it gives up a chance to block a
channel that has an honest node sending on.
Denote pT the desired jamming probability of the attackers. That means,
in any time slot, with probability pT , all non-sending attackers decide to jam
and with probability 1   pT , all non-sending attackers decide not to jam.
Because we are only concerned about the detectability of the attackers, we
will only consider the time slots that all non-sending attackers decide to jam.
That means, in the following analysis, we assume that in each time slot all
non-sending attackers will decide to jam coordinately. In other words, for
any attacker j 2 J , pjamj = 1  psendj .
Let us now consider an honest node s 2 NnJ with the sending rate
psends and a jammer j 2 J with the sending rate psendj and the jamming rate
pjamj = 1  psendj .
At a time slot, if s decides to send, the probability that s sends a successful
message to the base station and thus gets a s-alibi is
psends Pr[no attackers jam on a particular channel j at least one attacker jams] =
psends  Pr[A(J )j B(J )] = psends  Pr[A(J ) \ B(J )]=P [ B(J )]
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where A(J ) denotes the event of \no attackers in J jam on a particular
channel" , B(J ) denotes the event of \no attacker in J decides to jam" and
B(J ) denotes the event of \at least one attacker in J decides to jam". It is
easy to see that
Pr[B(J )] = 1  Pr[ B(J )] =
Y
i2J
(1  pjami )
. We now need to calculate Pr[A(J )] under the colluding strategy of the
attackers in J .
Let us consider a specic time slot where s sends. The expected number
of attackers sending in this time slot is
P
i2J p
send
i , which is also the expected
number of channels that the attackers use to send as scheduled. Thus, the
remaining (jCj  Pi2J psendi ) channels is the channel set that the attackers
may jam on and one of the channel is the channel that s is sending on.
Also, (jJ j  Pi2J psendi ) is the expected number of attackers deciding to
jam. Furthermore, those attackers only jam (uniformly) in the remaining
(jCj  Pi2J psendi ) channels. Thus, the probability that the channel that s
sends on does not get jammed is
Pr[A(J )] = (jCj  
P
i2J p
send
i )  (jJ j  
P
i2J p
send
i )
jCj  Pi2J psendi = jCj   jJ jjCj  Pi2J (1  pjami )
.
We have
Pr[A(J ) \ B(J )] = Pr[A(J )]  Pr[A(J ) \B(J )]
. Since
Pr[A(J ) \B(J )] = Pr[A(J )jB(J )] Pr[B(J )]
and Pr[A(J )jB(J )] = 1 (because the probability of no attackers jamming
on a particular channel given that no attackers deciding to jam is equal to
1), we have
Pr[A(J ) \ B(J )] = Pr[A(J )]  Pr[B(J )]
. Thus, the probability s gets an s-alibi in any time slot is
psends 
Pr[A(J )]  Pr[B(J )]
P [ B(J )] = p
send
s
Pr[A(J )]  Pr[B(J )]
1  P [B(J )]
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Similarly, for the attacker j, it obtains a s-alibi when it sends and at least
another attacker jams. That probability is
psendj Pr[B(J nj)] = psendj (1 
Y
i2Jnj
(1 pjami )) = (1 pjamj )(1 
Y
i2Jnj
(1 pjami ))
.
Let us denote a = Pr[A(J )] and b = Pr[B(J )]. Thus, we have
psends
Pr[A(J )]  Pr[B(J )]
1  P [B(J )] = p
send
s
a  b
1  b :
and
(1 pjamj )(1 
Y
i2Jnj
(1 pjami )) = (1 pjamj ) 
Y
i2J
(1 pjami ) = (1 pjamj ) b:
Thus, in order to have node s obtains S-alibis faster than j, we need
psends
a  b
1  b > (1  p
jam
j )  b
.

4.6 Detectability Analysis for Downlink Trac
The case of the down-link trac depends on whether nodes can successfully
send proofs to the base station. Once proofs are correctly received by the
base station, the analysis is similar to the case of the up-link trac. However,
the detection time will be longer due to two reasons. First, the base station
may have less number of transmissions than that of all the nodes. Second,
the proofs have to be sent back to the base station using a low throughput
channel.
4.7 Dealing with Slander Attacks on Uplink Trac
The alibi framework on a simple TDMA scheduling has one drawback: it
cannot defend against the slander attack on the up-link trac. In the slander
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Parameter Values
TDMA slot size 500ms
Number of channels 10
Number of nodes n = [10  40]
Number of attackers [1  9]
Jamming rate [0:1  1:0]
 0.001
Simulation time 1000 seconds
BBC maximum number of concurrent transmissions 50
BBC message length in time 4s
Number of BBC messages per proof-exchange period 10
Table 4.1: Simulation parameters
attack, the attacker chooses a set of victim nodes and does not jam whenever
a victim node becomes a sender. This attack will prevent any victim nodes
to get s-alibis because there is no jamming activities whenever the victim
nodes become the sender.
To deal with the slander attacks, it is required that the attackers do not
know when a node becomes a sender. Specically, the base station has to
ensure the following two properties of the TDMA schedule for nodes.
1. Randomness : The schedule has to be random for each period.
2. Condentiality : The schedule of a node is known by that node and the
base station only.
Both properties ensure that the attacker cannot guess which slots belong
to a node and thus cannot perform the slander attacks. The rst property can
be done by having the base station randomly shue the TDMA schedule for
each period. The second property can be ensured by encrypting the schedule
using they key of the destine node.
4.8 Evaluation
We evaluate the proposed protocols in TOSSIM. The TDMA MAC is imple-
mented by modifying the existing MAC of MICAz. The simulation param-
eters are listed in Table 4.1. Each scenario is repeated 5 times to get the
condent statistics.
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4.8.1 Non-colluding Attackers
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show the performance of the alibi framework in identifying
non-colluding attackers. Specically, Figure 4.6 shows the performance of
the alibi framework for the case where all attackers with probability 1:0.
Particularly, Figure 4.6(a) shows a high accuracy detection probability while
achieving low number of false alarms (Figure 4.6(b)). Figures 4.6(c) and
4.6(d) further show the detection time of the framework and the network
performance in terms of packet error rate, respectively.
Figure 4.7 shows the performance of the alibi framework for the case of
the network size n = 40. As shown in the gures, higher jamming rates will
lead to better detection accuracy because more alibis can be granted to the
honest nodes.
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Figure 4.6: Performance for the case of non-colluding attackers, pj=1
35
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
D
et
ec
tio
n 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
(%
)
#Jammers
pj=0.2
pj=0.4
pj=0.6
pj=0.8
pj=1.0
(a) Detection probability (non-colluding),
n=40
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
 45
 50
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
#F
al
se
 A
la
rm
s
#Jammers
pj=0.2
pj=0.4
pj=0.6
pj=0.8
pj=1.0
(b) False alarms (non-colluding), n=40
 0
 100
 200
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
D
et
ec
tio
n 
Ti
m
e 
(s)
#Jammers
pj=0.2
pj=0.4
pj=0.6
pj=0.8
pj=1.0
(c) Detection Time (non-colluding), n=40
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
Pa
ck
et
 E
rro
r R
at
e 
(P
ER
)
#Jammers
pj=0.2
pj=0.4
pj=0.6
pj=0.8
pj=1.0
(d) Packet error rate (non-colluding),
n=40)
Figure 4.7: Performance for the case of non-colluding attackers, n=40
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4.8.2 Colluding Attackers
We also evaluate the performance of the alibi framework for the case of col-
luding attackers. In the evaluation, the colluding attackers are coordinated.
They have a smart jamming strategy as follows.
 The jammers aim at a specic total jamming target and distribute the
jamming eort evenly. They never have overlapping jamming (i.e., no
two jammers will jam the same channel). For example, if the total
jamming target is 1:0 and there are 5 jammers, each jammer will jam
0:2 on average.
 In each time slot, the jammers decide to jam or not according the total
jamming target. If they decide to jam, each of the jammer selects
a random channel to jam. If the selected channel happens to be the
channel that another channel is supposed to send the uplink trac (not
the channel that another jammer will jam), the selecting jammer will
act on behalf o that jammer and sends a legitimate packet to get an
S-alibi. This strategy will guarantee that if a jammer does not have a
useful jamming, i.e., jamming on the uplink channel of an honest node,
it will send a legitimate packet and get an alibi instead.
Figure 4.8 shows the performance of the alibi framework for the case
of colluding attackers when the total jamming target is 1. Specically, as
shown in Figures 4.8(a) and 4.8(c), the system cannot cope with more than
5 attackers. The reason is that when the number of attackers is more than
half of the number of channels, they can always manage to have more S-
alibis than other nodes (see Theorem 2). Figures 4.8(c) and 4.8(d) show the
detection time and the packet error rate, respectively.
Figure 4.9(a) shows the the performance of the alibi framework for the
case of colluding attackers when the network size is 40 and the total jamming
target is varied. As shown in Figure 4.9(a) and 4.9(b), when the total jam-
ming target is less, the system can cope with more attackers. Figures 4.9(c)
and 4.9(d) show the detection time and the packet error rate, respectively.
The overall results show that it is much harder to identify colluding attack-
ers than to identify non-colluding attackers due to the knowledge of the alibi
protocols and the coordination among the attackers.
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Figure 4.8: Performance for the case of colluding attackers, pj=1
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Notation Values
N the set of nodes in the network
J the set of jammers (J  N )
C the set of channels
pjamj The jamming rate of attacker j
psendj The sending rate of a node j
psendsmin the minimum sending rate of all honest nodes
Table 4.2: Table of notations used in this chapter
4.9 Discussions
The proposed design of the alibi framework has the following advantages.
 It is simple but yet can identify the attackers jamming in most of the
up-link trac and down-link trac scenarios.
 It can deal with colluding attackers and slander attacks.
The framework also has the following disadvantages.
 It requires the base station to be able to send/receive simultaneously
in all channels.
 It can only work for TDMA scheduling.
 It cannot work when the number of colluding attackers is more than
half of the number of nodes or more than half of the number of channels.
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CHAPTER 5
R-ALIBI DESIGN FOR MULTI-CHANNEL
SINGLE-HOP AD-HOC NETWORKS
5.1 System Model
5.1.1 Network Model
We consider a multi-channel single-hop ad hoc wireless network as shown in
Figure 5.1. Some nodes in the network are insider jammers. We assume that
these jammers can aect at least several nodes (if not all) of the considered
wireless network. We assume there is one trusted node G in the network.
The trusted node can be elected by any leader election algorithm such as the
one proposed in [21].
1
2
5
4
3
Figure 5.1: Network Model
Denote N = 1; : : : ; jN j the set of nodes in the network and n the number
of nodes (n = jN j). Nodes in the network use a multi-channel MAC protocol
such as Slotted Seeded Channel Hopping (SSCH) [22] or McMAC [23]. The
main reasons for the suggestion of these multi-channel MAC protocols are:
1. These MAC protocols improve the capacity of the wireless networks.
They generally do not require any special hardware other than a com-
modity wireless cards such as 802.11.
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2. They are multiple-rendezvous protocols in which multiple device pairs
can make agreements simultaneously on distinct channels [24]. This
eliminates the problem of single control channel bottleneck - a sweet
spot for the jammer to target on. This is very important because a
jammed control channel may drastically reduce the eective throughput
close to zero [12][13].
In the design of this framework, we use SSCH [22]. In SSCH, each node
i has a set of nsschi randomly generated channel seeds. Each channel seed is
a pair of (x, a), where x (x 2 C) is the initial channel and a (a 2 C) is the
seed of the schedule. Each channel seed is used to calculate the new channel
from the old channel in each time slot. Specically, the new channel xnew is
calculated from the old channel xold as
xnew = (xold + a) mod jCj:
, where jCj is the number of channels.
Channel seeds are used in round-robin manner. Specically, in seed slot
s (s = 0; : : : ; nsschi   1), node i will hop to the channel calculated from the
channel seed s-th. Figure 5.2 illustrates SSCH schedules for two nodes A
and B. Node A has two channel seeds (1; 2) and (2; 1). Node B also has
two channel seeds (1; 2) and (0; 1). A and B use the two channel seeds
alternatively in each time slot. Initially, in the rst time slot, A uses the
rst channel seed (1; 2) and thus goes to channel 1. Similarly, B goes to
channel 1 in the rst time slot. In the second time slot, A and B will use the
second channel seed. That means, A;B will go to channel 2; 0, respectively.
In the third time slot, A will use the rst channel seed (1; 2). Because the old
channel corresponding to this channel seed that A used is 1, the new channel
that A uses is (1 + 2) mod 3 = 0. Similarly, in the third time slot, B's new
channel is (1 + 2) mod 3 = 0. For the time slot 4; 5; 6, the new channels for
A and B are calculated in a similar manner. The time slot 7 (i.e., the slot
with shaded background) is the parity slot in which the channels that A and
B use are set to the seed being used, instead of the calculated channel like
previous time slots. The reason for the parity time slots is to ensure that
any pair of nodes will meet occasionally, even when their channel seeds have
dierent initial channel (i.e., xi) and the same seed (i.e., ai).
If the number of channels is a prime number, SSCH schedules have a
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1 2 0 0 2 1 2 1
1 0 0 1 2 2 2 1
(1,2)
(2,1) (2,1)
(0,2)
(0,1)
(2,2) (1,2) (1,2)
(1,1) (2,1)
(x1,a1)
(x2,a2)
A
B
Slot 1 2 1 2 1 2 P 1
(1,2)
(0,1) (0,1)
(0,2)
(1,1)
(2,2) (1,2) (1,2)
(2,1) (2,1)
(x1,a1)
(x2,a2)
Slot 1 2 1 2 1 2 P 1
X
Y
Node goes to Channel X in this slot.
Parity slot. Node goes to Channel Y, 
and then repreats the cycle.
Figure 5.2: An illustration of channel hopping schedules for two nodes A
and B with 3 channels and two channel seeds. P denotes the parity slot.
mathematical property that two nodes will guarantee to meet at least once
per cycle. Specically, consider any pair of two channel (x; a) and (x0; a0),
the following properties hold as shown in [22].
 If x = x0 and a = a0, they are synchronized with each other.
 If x = x0 and a 6= a0, they will meet exactly once per cycle.
 If x 6= x0 and a = a0, they will meet exactly once per cycle at the parity
slot.
In the third case above, SSCH has to use parity slots where nodes hop to
the channel equal to the seed to prevent the o-schedule of nodes sharing the
same seed.
When joining the network, each node will randomly generate a set of
channel seeds. Nodes periodically broadcast their schedule, represented by
the set of generated channel seeds. For node A wanting to send to node B,
A rst learns the schedule of node B when they are occasionally in the same
channel. Then, A will change one of its channel seeds to one of the channel
seeds broadcasted by B. In this way, A will partially synchronize with B.
When A is in the same channel with B, it uses CSMA/CA to transmit
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the packets to B to minimize the collisions with other senders in the same
channel. Also, when A changes the channel seed to synchronize with B for
its transmission, A will mark that channel seed as \sending seed". Node B,
when seeing a channel seed that always has packets destined to it, will also
mark that channel seed as \receiving seed" and lock that channel seed. A
locked channel seed cannot be changed for any sending purpose. However,
if a node wants to send packets and all channel seeds are locked, it will pick
a channel seed and change it to the intended receiver's channel seed. In the
example above, assuming A wants to send to B, A is partially synchronized
with B because their rst channel seeds are identical. A will mark its rst
channel seed (i.e., (1; 2)) as \sending seed". B will mark its rst channel
seed (i.e., (1; 2)) as \receiving seed".
5.1.2 Attack Model
There are several compromised nodes that are insider jammers. For a jammer
j with the jamming rate pjamj , in each time slot, if it decides to jam with
probability pjamj , it will uniformly pick a random channel in C to perform
reactive jamming attacks. That means, once it is on the target channel, it
will look for preambles and jam the bodies of the data packets. However, if
it decides not to jam, it will follow the protocol like other honest nodes.
5.2 Basic Idea: Receiving-based Alibis
The basic idea is to exploit the limited capabilities of the jammer j: he cannot
jam and receive simultaneously. This limitation implies that if he jams on
one channel in a time slot, he cannot receive in the same time slot. This
opens a chance for good nodes to prove their honesty. If a group of nodes
receives the same corrupted packet content in a time slot, they can coherently
show that they cannot be the jammer at that time slot. Such jammed packet
contents are referred to as proof. Combinations of same proofs in the same
time slot will create receiving-based alibi (R-alibi). Nodes that obtain the
lowest number of R-alibis are accused as jammers.
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5.3 Basic Alibi Protocols
5.3.1 Proof Generation Protocol
When an honest node is idle in any time slots (i.e., no sending or receiving), it
switches to a uniformly random channel in C to become a witness. However,
if a node is never idle (i.e., it is always in sending or receiving mode), it
has to dedicate several time slots to become a witness. Denote pwitnessi to
be the probability of a node being witness in each time slot. Intuitively,
increasing pwitnessi will increase the probability of being a witness and the
probability of getting alibis but also decrease its network performance. For
example, if a node has always a packet to send, pwitnessi = 0:2 means it will
dedicate 20% of its slots to become a witness. Thus, pwitnessi can be used as
a parameter to control the trade-o between the probability of getting alibis
and the degradation of the network performance.
When a node i becomes a witness in a time slot t on channel c 2 C, it
receives the packet content PKT ct regardless of whether the packet is decod-
able or not. It will get the hashed content of the received packet by using a
good hash function H (e.g. CRC, SHA1 or MD5) and create a proof in the
following form:
proof = (t; c;H(PKT ct )).
An honest node stores proofs and sends them to G when it believes that
it is under jamming attack. A node detects the presence of a jamming attack
when the number of its sending packets getting unacknowledged exceeds a
threshold. Once it detects that it is under attack, it will switch to the proof-
exchange mode in which it tries to send proofs that has been collected to G
using a jamming-resistant communication. Depending on the maximum size
of the data packet, the node will add as many proofs as possible into the
proof packet destined to G. The proof packet will have the following format.
m = (i; (i; proof1; : : : ; proofmax)kG).
, where proofj is the proof j-th that node i has collected, max is the maximum
number of proofs that can be t into the data packet and kG is the public
key or shared key of G. The encryption ensures that other nodes receiving
the proof packet cannot do the replay attacks and that G can verify the
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integrity of the proof packet. If the proof packet is acknowledged by G, the
node will move on and send another set of proofs until it has no proofs to
send. Otherwise, it keeps trying sending the same proof packet.
Sending the proof to G needs a special handling because the jammers
may target to jam the proof packets destined to G. Such jamming attacks
on exchanging proof packets are possible because the schedule of G is known
to the jammers. Thus, the communication between the nodes and G has be
jamming-resistant.
5.3.2 Jamming-resistance for Proof-exchange Protocol
To make the proof-exchange protocol jamming-resistant, we apply a similar
technique in the UFH system [15]. During the proof-exchange period, honest
nodes randomly pick a channel from C in each time slot. Note that nodes
still use CSMA/CA to send proof packets to reduce collisions. When get-
ting acknowledged from G for a proof packet, a node moves on to the next
proof packet. The purpose of the random selection of the channel during the
proof-exchange period is to make it harder for the attackers to jam. More
importantly, it will prevent the jammers to perform slander attacks on any
node because the sending pattern is random and unknown to the attackers.
Because the schedule of G is known to the attackers, it is still possible
that attackers specically target the jamming attacks on node G to block any
possible communication to G. To avoid this situation, node G has to random-
ize its schedule as well. Specically, node G starts its proof-exchange period
in which it will randomize its schedule under two conditions: 1) it receives a
signicant number of corrupted packets and 2) it receives a signicant num-
ber of distinct nodes sending proof packets to it. The rst condition covers
the situation where node G is under jamming attack. The second condition
covers the situation where the jamming attackers target all other nodes but
node G so that G does not start the proof-exchange mode. Both conditions
involve thresholds which are system parameters. When switching to proof-
exchange period, node G will randomly pick a channel in each time slot.
Furthermore, it will only stay in the receiving mode until it can identify the
jammers.
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5.4 Dealing with Non-colluding Attackers
In this section, we give the analysis of the non-colluding attackers case under
the basic alibi protocols proposed in Section 5.3.
Theorem 3 (Identifying non-colluding attackers) In the network N with
the set of non-colluding jammers J = j1; : : : ; jjJ j with the jamming rate
pjamj1 ; : : : ; p
jam
jjJ j , the R-alibi framework can identify any jammer j 2 J if
pwitnessrmin (1 (1 
pjamj
jCj )(1 a))(1 (1 
1  pjamj
jCj )(
1  b
1  pwitnessrminjCj
)) > (1 pjamj )ab
, where pwitnessrmin is the minimum probability of being witness of all honest nodes
in the network,
a = 1 
Y
i2Jnj
(1  p
jam
i
jCj )
and
b = 1 
Y
i2Nnj
(1  p
witness
i
jCj )
.
Proof :
Consider a honest node r 2 NnJ and a jammer j 2 J . In any time slot,
node r will get an alibi if all following three events happen:
 r becomes a witness
 A(J ): at least an attacker in J jams on the channel r is witnessing
 B(Nnr): at least another node witnesses on the channel r is witnessing.
The rst condition happens with probability pwitnessr . The second condition
happens with probability P [A(J )] = 1  Qi2J (1   pjamijCj ), where (1   pjamijCj )
is the probability that attacker i 2 J does not jam on a particular channel.
The third condition happens with probability P [B(Nnr)] = 1 Qi2Nnr(1 
pwitnessi
jCj ), where (1  
pwitnessi
jCj ) is the probability that node i does not witness
on a particular channel. Thus, in an time slot, node r gets an alibi with the
probability
pwitnessr  P [A(J )] P [B(Nnr)]: (5.1)
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Similarly, for the attacker j, the probability that it can obtain an R-alibi
is
pwitnessj  P [A(J nj)] P [B(Nnj)]: (5.2)
To have r obtains alibis faster than j, we need the term in Eq. 5.1 to be
greater than the term in Eq. 5.2.
pwitnessr  P [A(J )] P [B(Nnr)] > pwitnessj  P [A(J nj)] P [B(Nnj)]:
It is obviously best for the attacker j to set pwitnessj = 1 pjamj . Thus, the
condition becomes
pwitnessr P [A(J )]P [B(Nnr)] > (1 pjamj )P [A(J nj)]P [B(Nnj)] (5.3)
.
We have P [A(J nj)] = 1 Qi2Jnj(1  pjamijCj ). Thus,
Y
i2Jnj
(1  p
jam
i
jCj ) = 1  P [A(J nj)]
. By multiplying both sides by (1  p
jam
j
jCj ), we obtain
Y
i2J
(1  p
jam
i
jCj ) = (1 
pjamj
jCj ) (1  P [A(J nj)])
Therefore,
P [A(J )] = 1 
Y
i2J
(1  p
jam
i
jCj ) = 1  (1 
pjamj
jCj )(1  P [A(J nj)]):
Denote a = P [A(J nj))]. The condition in Eq. 5.3 becomes
pwitnessr (1 
pjamj
jCj )(1 a))P [B(Nnr)] > (1 p
jam
j )aP [B(Nnj)] (5.4)
.
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Denote b = P [B(Nnj)] = 1 Qi2Nnj(1 pwitnessi jCj ) = 1 (1 pwitnessr jCj )Qi2Nnfj;rg(1 
pwitnessi
jCj ). Thus, Y
i2Nnfj;rg
(1  p
witness
i
jCj ) =
1  b
1  pwitnessr jCj
. By substituting the above term and 1   pwitnessj = pjamj into P [B(Nnr)],
we have
P [B(Nnr)] = 1 
Y
i2Nnr
(1  p
witness
i
jCj ) = 1  (1 
pwitnessj
jCj )
Y
i2Nnfj;rg
(1  p
witness
i
jCj )
= 1  (1  1  p
jam
j
jCj )(
1  b
1  pwitnessr jCj
)
Thus, the condition in Eq. 5.4 becomes
pwitnessr (1 (1 
pjamj
jCj )(1 a))(1 (1 
1  pjamj
jCj )(
1  b
1  pwitnessr jCj
)) > (1 pjamj )ab

5.5 Dealing with Colluding Attackers
In this case, we consider a set of colluding jammers J = j1; : : : ; jJ . Denote
k = jJ j. By collusion, we mean attackers can share any information among
themselves immediately by any means of communication. There are several
problems when collusion is possible. The rst problem is that attackers can
coherently lie about their proofs (i.e. hashed content of jammed packets) to
create \fake" R-alibis. To cope with this, we require at least k+ 1 witnesses
presenting same hashed content of a jamming packet to create a R-alibi for
all witnesses.
The second problem is that attackers can share alibis. For example, let
us consider the case of 2 colluding attackers. Let us assume one attacker
jams the network and the other attacker collects alibis. If there is no alibi-
sharing, the jamming one can be detected by our previous proposed detection
schemes. However, if alibis are shared to the jamming one, both attackers
can get alibis at the rate of other normal nodes and thus cannot be detected.
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In what follows, we will discuss how to cope with colluding attackers using
the concept of R-chains.
5.5.1 R-chains
Consider an attacker j1 who jams on channel c1 2 C at time slot t. To limit
the possibility that j1 gets a shared alibi from another attacker j2(j2 2 J nj1)
which correctly obtains an alibi on channel c2(c2 2 Cnc1) at time slot t, we
require j1 has to be able to explain its presence on channel c2 at time t. If
j1's explanation can be veried, j1's alibi is valid.
For a node to be able to explain its presence at time slot t on channel
c 2 C, it has to declare its sequence of being R-defendant before time slot t.
Let us denote R-chain(i,s,l) the sequence of l pairs (c1; s):::(cl; s + l   1) in
which node i becomes an R-defendant on channel cx at time slot s + x   1
(x = 1::l). Thus, R-chain(i,s,l) can be used to verify the validity of any
R-alibi for node i at any time in between [s; s+ l  1]. In other words, node
G will only generate an R-alibi for a node i at time slot t on channel c if and
only if 1) it receives R-chain(i,s,l) before time slot t and 2) the pair (c; t)
exists in the chain R-chain(i,s,l).
R-chain can drastically reduce the possibility of alibi-sharing behaviors of
the attackers. Essentially, any two attackers j1 and j2 can share an R-alibi
at time slot t on channel c only when (c; t) exists in both R-chain(j1,t1,l)
and R-chain(j2,t2,l). Thus, if all nodes (including attackers) are required
to declare their R-chains before trying to obtain any R-alibis, the attackers
cannot share alibis arbitrarily anymore.
Unfortunately, if R-chain of an honest node is known by the attackers,
the node is vulnerable to slander attacks. Basically, attackers can determin-
istically avoid jamming on channel c at time t if (c; t) is in the R-chains of
victim nodes. Thus, victim nodes will not be able to get any R-alibis. To
cope with the slander attacks, R-chains need to have certain randomness.
This will be discussed in the next section.
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5.5.2 One-way R-chains
The basic idea to introduce randomness into an R-chain while still making
it veriable is based on the concept of one-way chains. One-way chains are
widely used cryptographic primitive such as in Tesla [25].
A one-way chain is generated based on a one-way hash function F . To
generate a one-way chain of length l, we rst randomly pick the last element
of the chain el. Then, we generate the whole chain by repeatedly applying
the function F l times (i.e. el 1 = F (sl), el 2 = F (el 1) and so on). Finally,
e0 is the commitment to the entire one-way chain. e0 can always be used to
verify whether an element belongs to the chain i.e., any ei belongs to a chain
if and only if F i(si) = e0. The chain is released in the order from e0 to el.
There are several key properties of one-way chain that will be used to solve
our problem. First, each element ei in the one-way chain can be considered
as a random value uniformly drawn from the output space of one-way hash
function F . Second, once the rst element of the chain e0 is released to the
network, any later element of the chain ei (i > 0) cannot be changed and
can be veried by checking whether F i(ei) = e0. Third, due to the property
of one-way hash function F , the knowledge of element ei does not reveal any
information about ej for any j > i. Lastly and most importantly, elements of
a one-way chain have to be generated by applying the pre-selected one-way
hash function F and cannot be generated arbitrarily.
In our alibi framework, a one-way chain is used to generate a one-way
R-chain as follows. Time is divided into epochs of l time slots. An R-chain
has a length of l. Each node generates its R-chain at the beginning of each
epoch. To generate an R-chain of length l, a node i randomly selects a value
sil. The whole chain is then generated from s
i
l by repeatedly applying F in
the same way to generate a one-way chain of length l.
For a node i, at a time slot t of an epoch (1  t  l), it uses element sit of
the chain to calculate the channel cit on which it will become an R-defendant
at time slot t. Specically,
cit = s
i
t mod (djCj=pwitnessi e)
, where pwitnessi is the probability of being a R-defendant. So, at time slot
t if cit  jCj, node i becomes an R-defendant on channel cit and does not
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become a witness otherwise. If the hash function is uniform, the probability
of being a witness for node i is jCj
(djCj=pwitnessi e)
 pwitnessi . Thus, this basically
emulates the probability pwitnessi of being witness of node i. Note that the
imprecision of the probability comes from the ceiling operation. However,
the imprecision is bounded by
jCj
(jCj=pwitnessi )
  jCj
(jCj=pwitnessi + 1)
=
jCj
(jCj=pwitnessi ) (jCj=pwitnessi + 1)
=
=
pwitnessi
(jCj=pwitnessi + 1)
<
1
jCj+ 1 :
F(sil)F(sil-1)
silSil-1
F(si2)F(si1)Si0
cil-1
Sil-1
mod 
(C/pw)
…Si1
ci1
Si1
mod 
(C/pw)
Figure 5.3: An illustration of one-way R-chain
Figure 5.3 illustrates the whole process of generating an one-way R-chain
of node i at the beginning of an epoch of l time slots. The chain si0; : : : ; s
i
l is
generated in advance. Each sij (j = 1::l) is used to generate c
i
j - the channel
that node i will hop to at time slot j in the epoch.
Similar to Section 5.3, the content of a proof of node i at time slot t on
channel c now has to include sit. That means, the proof message is
m = (t; c; si0; s
i
t; H(PKT
c
t )).
, where PKT ct is the received packet content at time t on channel c.
With this scheme, any recipient (including G) of a proof message of node
i can verify whether node i follows its one-way chain by checking whether
F t(sit) = s
i
0 and c
i
t = s
i
t mod (jCj=pw). If either check failed, the proof
message is invalid and will not be considered for generating alibi.
It is also important to emphasize that by using one-way R-chain, the
number of witnesses required to have a valid alibi can be less than k + 11.
This is because the attackers cannot arbitrarily claim or share alibis anymore.
1(k+1) proofs guarantee a valid alibi because there is k attackers
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However, a smaller value of the threshold will have an implication on a safe-
jam strategy of the attackers presented next.
5.5.3 Analysis of One-way R-chains
As shown in the previous section, because (sit mod (djCj=pw)e) is uniform
in [0; djCj=pwe], honest node i still becomes an R-defendant with probability
pwitnessi and behaves like in the non-colluding scheme.
For attackers, under one-way R-chains, collusion is limited. Specically,
two attackers i and j can collude at the overlaps of their R-chains (i.e. at any
time slot t, where cit = c
j
t). Thus, if attacker i jams at time t and attacker j
becomes an R-defendant on the channel cjt = c
i
t at time t, node j will get an
R-alibi. Furthermore, if node j shares this alibi to node i, they can achieve
both jamming and collecting alibis at the same time. That means such a pair
of attackers that colludes in the way just described is undetectable under the
one-way R-alibi scheme. We refer to this strategy as safe-jam strategy.
The success of the safe-jam strategy depends on the threshold kalibi that
the number of witnesses on the same channel at the same time slot has to
be greater than to get an R-alibi. The maximum value of kalibi is (k + 1)
because there are k attackers. Smaller value of kalibi will make both the
honest nodes and the attackers to get alibis easier. We now will analyze the
safe-jam strategy under the threshold kalibi.
The probability that x attackers select the same particular channel is the
binomial distribution with the probability of successful trial q = 1=jCj,
P [x attackers select the same channel] =
jCj
x

qx(1  q)jCj x
. If x = kalibi, the selected channel can be jammed safely. Furthermore, if
x > kalibi, then the remaining x   kalibi attackers can safely jam any other
channels because they already have the shared alibis from the k attackers
that stay on the same channel. Therefore, given that x  kalibi, the number
of channels can be jammed safely is x kalibi+1. Thus, the expected number
of channels that can be jammed under the safe-jam strategy is
Usafejam =
X
x=kalibi
P [x attackers select the same channel] (x  kalibi + 1) =
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jJ jX
x=kalibi
jCj
x

qx(1  q)jCj x(x  kalibi + 1) (5.5)
.
Figure 5.4 shows Usafejam, calculated from Eq. 5.5, for the case of jCj =
11; 23 and kalibi = 2. The x-axis denotes Usafejam - the expected number of
channels that can be safely jammed. It is shown that Usafejam is around 30%
of the total number of channels.
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Figure 5.4: Numerical results for the number of jammed channels Usafejam
under the safe-jam strategy
5.6 Evaluation
5.6.1 Simulation Setup
We evaluate the proposed protocols in TOSSIM. SSCH is implemented by
modifying the existing MAC. Each node has 4 channel seeds (similar to the
implementation in [22]). Each channel seed can be either \sending", \receiv-
ing" or \idle". A node only becomes a witness in the time slots where one
of its idle channel seeds is used. There are n=2 CBR trac ows established
randomly and uniformly between pairs of nodes. In a CBR ow, the sender
will send a data packet to the selected receiver in every 100ms. In the simu-
lation, all jammers use the same jamming probability pjam. The simulation
parameters are listed in Table 5.1. In each scenario, we calculate the average
detection probability, average false alarm rate, average detection time and
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Parameter Values
TDMA slot size 100ms
Number of channels 10
Number of nodes n [10  40]
Number of CBR ows n=2
Number of attackers [1  9]
Jamming rate pjam [0:1  1:0]
 0.001
Simulation time 200 seconds
Table 5.1: Simulation parameters
packet error rate. We also repeat each scenario 10 times to get the condent
statistics.
5.6.2 Simulation Results
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the performance of the proposed system for the case
of non-colluding attackers. Specically, Figure 5.5 shows the results in which
the network size is varied from 10 to 40 and the jamming probability of all
attackers are set to 0.6. Figure 5.5(a) shows that the detection probability
increases when the network size increases. This is because more nodes with
more trac will give create more chances for honest nodes to get alibis.
Figure 5.5(a) also shows that more attackers will make it harder to identify
them, especially those with low jamming probability. This is because when
there are more attackers, any attacker with low jamming probability can have
more chances to get alibis from the other attackers' jamming actions. Figure
5.5(b) shows that the false alarm rate is maintained within the expected
false alarm rate . Figure 5.5(c) further shows the detection time which can
be similarly explained as in Figure5.5(a). Figure 5.5(d) shows the average
packet loss. As the number of attackers increase, the packet loss rate also
increases.
Figure 5.6 shows the results in which the network size n is set to 40 and
the jamming probability pjam is varied from 0:1 to 1:0. Figure 5.6(a) shows
the detection probability of the proposed system. The detection probability
increases when the jamming rate increases. This behavior shows the cor-
rectness of the principle of alibis: the more the attackers jam, the easier to
detect them. It also shows that more attackers will make it harder to identify
them, especially those with low jamming probability. This is because when
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there are more attackers, any attacker with low jamming probability can have
more chances to get alibis from the other attackers' jamming actions. For
attackers with high jamming probability, there will be no dierence because
they are always busy jamming. Figure 5.5(b) shows the correct false alarm
rate according to the threshold . Figures 5.6(c) and 5.6(d) further show the
detection time and the packet error rate, respectively.
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Figure 5.5: Non-colluding attackers: The impact of network size n
(pjam = 0:6).
5.7 Discussions
The receiving-based alibi framework discussed in this chapter has the follow-
ing advantages.
 It can work on multi-channel wireless LANs.
 It can deal with both multiple non-colluding and colluding attackers.
With the proposed solution, the damage done by the colluding attackers
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Figure 5.6: Non-colluding attackers: The impact of jamming probability
pjam (n = 40).
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is limited.
 It is a reactive defense strategy. That means, it is only activated when
the attackers are present in the system. Once the attackers are removed,
the alibi scheme will not incur any overhead.
The framework also has following disadvantages. However, it also has the
following disadvantages.
 The colluding attackers can perform a safe-jam strategy to damage the
network without getting detected.
 The proposed jamming-resistant communication for proof exchanges
may be long, depending on the number of channels.
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CHAPTER 6
R-ALIBI DESIGN FOR SINGLE-CHANNEL
WLANS
6.1 Overview
In this chapter, we consider a design of the alibi framework for single-channel
wireless LANs. Because there is only one channel, sending-based alibis will
not possible. Thus, the design relies on the receiving-based alibis. The
basic idea is to exploit the half-duplex nature of the jammers: the jammers
cannot send and receive at the same time. Thus, whenever an attacker jams
a packet, it cannot guess the content of the corrupted packet because it
does not know the content of the sending packet. Thus, any nodes that can
show \correct" corrupted (or uncorrupted) packet content can prove that it
cannot be the cause of the jammed packet. The corrupted (or uncorrupted)
packet content is \correct" if there are several other receivers agreeing on
the same packet content. We call the received packet content as \proof of
reception". Combination of proofs of reception from several receivers creates
\alibis". Figure 6.1 illustrates how each node gets alibis on jamming events
by node 5. In Figure 6.1(a), node 3's message is jammed. Node 2 and 6
receive a corrupted packet. If they both show the content corrupted packet,
they can both claim an alibi. Note that nodes 4 and 8 may also receive a
packet from node 5. However, they cannot get any alibis because the received
packet is uncorrupted. Similarly, in Figure 6.1(b), when node 1's message
is jammed, node 2 and 4 will get an alibi by showing proofs of receiving an
corrupted packet. Thus, after sucient jamming events, each honest node
in the network gets at least one alibi while the jammer (node 5) cannot get
any alibis. At that point, the jammer can be identied.
59
35
1 2
4
7 8 9
6
(a) Node 3's message is jammed by
node 5. Nodes 2, 6 get an alibi
by showing the content of the cor-
rupted packet.
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(b) Node 1's message is jammed by
node 5. Nodes 2, 4 get an alibi
by showing the content of the cor-
rupted packet.
Figure 6.1: Example of Alibi Scheme.
6.2 Assumptions, Notations and Denitions
6.2.1 Network model
We consider a single-channel WLAN of n nodes. One node is the trusted
base station. Denote N as the set of the nodes in the network (i.e, jN j = n).
Each node in the network is equipped with a half-duplex radio, i.e., it cannot
transmit and receive at the same time. Thus, there will be non-negligible
delay to switch from transmit mode to receive mode and vice versa. We
assume CRC-failed packets are still delivered to the upper layer. We assume
each node uses CSMA/CA MAC. We also assume a central detection model,
i.e., nodes will send information to the base station.
We assume that the messages between the base station and any node are
encrypted using the shared key between the base station and that node. Note
that the assumption implies that the encrypted message will look uniformly
random to any overhearing nodes that do not have the shared key. Also, the
encryption/decryption is done at the layer above the MAC layer (e.g., IP
layer or application layer) and thus CRC-failed encrypted messages are still
delivered to the MAC layer.
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6.2.2 Attack model
We assume some nodes in the network are the reactive jamming attackers.
Thus, the attackers also have same physical capabilities as other nodes. The
attackers, however, have the complete control of the MAC, physical param-
eters of the radio network interface. The attackers are insider attackers.
That means, they are assumed to know any security-related information of
the node such as security keys. They also know any protocols used in the
system.
The goal of the attackers is to remain undetected while maximizing the
number of jammed packets. The attackers use probabilistic reactive jamming
strategy. That means whenever an attacker J senses an on-going packet by
detecting the presence of a preamble, it will transmit a jamming packet
with probability pJ . pJ is called the \reactive jamming probability" and is
dened for each sending packet. This denition is dierent from traditional
jamming rate in the literature which is dened over each time slot regardless
of whether there is sending packet in that time slot. Henceforth, the term
\jamming rate" refers to \reactive jamming rate" unless explicitly specied.
6.2.3 Denitions and Notations
Denote S(t) as the set of transmitters at time slot t. Denote PS!r(t) as the
packet content received by the receiver r under the concurrent sending of
senders in S(t). Denote PRS!r(t) (S  Nnr) the proof of reception for a
receiver r at time slot t.
Denition 3 (Alibi of reception (AR)) An alibi of reception for two re-
ceivers r and q at time slot t under the set of sender S is dened as
ARS!r;q(t) = correlation(PRS!r(t); PRS!q(t))
, where correlation is the correlation function dened in Equation 6.1.
Denition 4 (-alibi neighbors) Two nodes r and q are called -alibi
neighbors (0    1) under a set of senders S in the time slot set T =
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t1; t2; ::; tjT j if
E[ARS!r;q(T )] = 1jT j
X
8t2T
ARS!r;q(t)  
The denition above involves the average of alibi correlation of two re-
ceivers over a set of time slots. This is because we do not know the exact
distribution of the alibi correlation of any two receivers1. Thus, our analysis
will rely only on the average and deviation of the alibi correlation derived
from the experiments described in Section 6.3.
Denition 5 (-jammer) A jammer is called -alibi-jammer (  0:5) if
it can guess correctly the outcome of the packet from a sender s 2 N caused
by its jamming actions with probability .
Based on our experiments, which is also conrmed in [26], it is very hard to
guess the content of the jammed packet. Thus, the best the jammer can do
is a random guess which results in  = 0:5.
Denition 6 (Complete alibi-safe topology) A wireless network topol-
ogy is called (; )-alibi-safe topology if for all pairs of sender s 2 N and
jammer j 2 N , every node r 2 Nnfs; jg has at least  -alibi neighbors.
The denition above is strict because it requires that for any possible lo-
cations of the jammer and the sender, any receiver always has at least 
-neighbors. This guarantees that any honest node is always alibi-safe re-
gardless of where the attackers may be. However, if we know some nodes
in the network that can be trusted, we can have a looser denition. For
example, in our WLAN setting, the base station can be trusted. Thus, we
only need to make sure that every node has at least  -neighbors under the
sending messages from the base station jammed by any possible jammer.
Denition 7 (Alibi-safe topology with trusted senders) A wireless net-
work topology is called (; ;)-alibi-safe topology under a set of trusted
senders   N if for all pairs of sender s 2  and jammer j 2 Nn,
every receiver r 2 Nnfj;g has at least  -alibi neighbors.
1In fact, to the best of our knowledge, there is no theoretical model capturing the
distribution of the content correlation under concurrent transmissions.
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6.3 Impact of Reactive Jamming Attacks
It might be noticed that in the example above we assume received corrupted
packets, caused by the same jamming event, have the same content (e.g.,
nodes 2 and 6 in Figure 6.1(a)). In practice, this might not be the case.
Thus, in this section, we will carry out several experiments on a testbed
of MICAz motes with CC2420 radio to answer following two questions: 1)
what are the capabilities of reactive jamming attacks? and 2) what is the
correlation of corrupted packet contents under reactive jamming attacks?.
6.3.1 Impact of Reactive Jamming Attacks on Network
Performance
In our experiments, a reactive jamming attack is performed on a set of 3
nodes as shown in Figure 6.2(a). Nodes are placed such that they can hear
each other at the strongest power level (i.e., level 31, 0dbm). S and J are
the sender and jammer, respectively. R is the receiver who receives packets
from S; J . C acts as the experiment controller.
To produce a reactive jamming attack, C will broadcast a message. Upon
receiving the broadcast message from C, S starts sending a message of 43
bytes including 32-byte random payload and 11-byte MICAz header. J also
starts sending a message of 43 bytes, including 32-byte all-0 payload and
11-byte MICAz header, but with a delay  > 0.  is chosen such that the
jamming packet will arrive at the receiver after the preamble of the sender.
This is just to make sure we have a correct implementation of a reactive
jammer. In our experiments,  is between 150s and 200s. Note that we
disable the clear channel assessment (CCA) and backo mechanism of S and
J to ensure concurrent transmissions and CRC check mechanism of R. R
records any messages right after the broadcast message from C. The recorded
messages are then time-stamped and sent back to C for trace collection. For
condent statistics, each experiment is repeated 200 times.
It is known that signal-to-interference-noise-ratio (SINR) will decide the
packet content. Theoretically, SINR =
PRS
PRJ +PN
, where PRS and P
R
J are the
received powers of the signal sent from S and J at the receiver R; PN is
the noise power. PS and PJ can be calculated as P
R
S = PS  dSR  and
PRS = PS  dJR , where PS; PJ are the sending powers of S;R; dSR; dJR are
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the distance from S; J to R; and  is the path loss factor. Therefore, the
major factors aecting SINR are the distance between S ! R; J ! R and
the sending powers of S; J . Thus, in our experiments, we vary the distance
between S ! R; J ! R and the sending powers of S; J . We put 6 MICAz
motes in the line as shown in Figure 6.2(b). In a reactive jamming attack
scenario, we have one sender at mote i (i = 1::6) with the sending power level
k (k = 1::30), one jammer at mote j (j 6= i; j = 1::6) with the sending power
level l (l = 1::30) and 4 receivers at remaining nodes. We try all possible
combinations of (i; j) in 6 positions where j > i. For each (i; j) pair, we will
perform following experiments.
 We measure the received signal strength indication (RSSI) from the
sender to each receiver R, denoted as RSSISR(dSR; PS), without any
sending of the jammer.
 Similarly, we also measure the RSSI from the jammer to each receiver
R, denoted as RSSIJR(dJR; PJ), without any sending of the sender.
 We collect corrupted packets at each receiver under reactive jamming
attacks (i.e., both sender and jammer sending) for content correlation
calculation.
Figure 6.3(a) shows the RSSI at a receiver 1ft away from the sender and
the receiver at dierent sending power levels, i.e., RSSISR(1ft; PS) and
RSSIJR(1ft; PJ). The x-axis is sending power level of the sender and the
jammer (PS; PJ). The y-axis is the RSSI in dbm.
S JR
C
(a) Reactive jamming attack con-
guration
1 2 3 6
1ft 1ft
.
C
(b) Topology of 6 nodes
Figure 6.2: Reactive jamming experiment settings
Figure 6.3(b) shows the packet error rate under reactive jamming attacks.
The x-axis, denoted by \RSSI by sender" (i.e., RSSISR), is the RSSI of the
signal from the sender to the receiver. Note that the RSSI metric takes
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into account of both the sending power and the distance between the sender
and the receiver. Similarly, the y-axis, denoted by \RSSI by jammer" (i.e.,
RSSIJR), is the RSSI of the signal from the jammer to the receiver. A pair
of RSSI from the sender and the jammer characterizes a receiver. The z-axis
shows the packet error rate of each receiver.
From the graph, we have the following observations.
 If RSSISR(dSR; PS) >> RSSIJR(dJR; PJ), the packet error rate de-
creases sharply to 0. This region is referred to as the \white" region.
Receivers in this region are called white receivers.
 If RSSISR(dSR; PS) << RSSIJR(dJR; PJ), the packet error rate in-
creases sharply to 1. This region is referred to as the \black" region.
Receivers in this region are called black receivers.
 When RSSISR(dSR; PS) and RSSIJR(dJR; PJ) are close (< 5dbm dif-
ference), the packet error rate is between 0 and 1. This region is re-
ferred to as the \grey" region. Receivers in this region are called grey
receivers.
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Figure 6.3: Results on reactive jamming experiments
6.3.2 Reception Correlation under Reactive Jamming Attacks
We want to see the correlation2 of received packet content of any pair of
receivers under reactive jamming attacks. We treat a packet content as a
2The term \correlation" used in this paper means the similarity.
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binary string. The correlation of two packet contents is dened as the simi-
larity of the two corresponding binary strings. The similarity of two binary
strings B1; B2 of length l is dened as
correlation(B1; B2) = 1  H(B1; B2)
l
(6.1)
, where H(B1; B2) is the Hamming distance of B1 and B2 dened as the num-
ber of positions at which the corresponding bits of B1 and B2 are dierent.
The correlation has a range of [0; 1]. Correlation of 0 means two packet con-
tents are completely dierent. Correlation of 1 means two packet contents
are identical.
We correlate all received packet content of each pair of receivers. Thus,
we have a correlation table whose lines are tuples of (RSSISR1 ; RSSIJR1
; RSSISR2 ; RSSIJR2 ; CORR). The pairs (RSSISR1 ; RSSIJR1) and (RSSISR2 ;
RSSIJR2) characterize the rst and the second receiver, respectively. CORR
is the average of correlation of received packet content of R1 and R2. Note
that in our experiments, the lowest correlation is 0:5, statistically. This is be-
cause the content of the sending packet is uniformly generated, i.e., each bit
is uniformly generated between 0 and 1. After constructing the correlation
table, we have the following observations.
 For a white receiver (i.e., successful reception), it will have very strong
correlation (close to 1) with other white receivers. This is obvious
because nodes in the white region have successful packet reception.
It has a wide range of weak correlation with grey receivers (range of
[0:55; 0:95]). This can be explained as the grey receivers still have
some correct bits from the sender's content. However, a white re-
ceiver has very weak correlation with black receivers (range of less than
0:55). Figure 6.4(a) shows the correlation of a typical white receiver R
(RSSISR =  50dbm, RSSIJR =  64dbm) with all other receivers.
 Similarly, for a black receiver (i.e., unsuccessful reception), it has a
very strong correlation with other black receivers, a wide range of weak
correlation with grey receivers and very weak correlation with white
receivers. Figure 6.4(b) shows the correlation of a typical black receiver
R (RSSISR =  59dbm, RSSIJR =  54dbm) with all other receivers.
 For a grey receiver, it has a strong correlation (range of [0:6; 0:8]) with
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Figure 6.4: Experiment results on the correlation (z-axis: darker colors
represents higher values)
other grey receivers in the grey region. It has wide range of a week
correlation with black and white receivers. Figure 6.4(c) shows the cor-
relation of a grey receiver R (RSSISR =  59dbm, RSSIJR =  61dbm)
with all other receivers.
From this experimental study, we can conclude that the correlation of
received packet content under reactive jamming attacks has the
locality property. That means, receivers closer in the RSSI plane have
stronger correlations of packet contents. This is very important for the design
of alibi framework.
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6.4 Alibi Identication Algorithms
6.4.1 Identifying Non-colluding Attackers
Algorithm: The basic identication algorithm relies on the fact that a jammer
can only do a guess with  correlation with the content of the packet it jams.
That means, whenever it jams a packet, it only has  correlation while the
other nodes get at least  correlation (statistically). Let us dene an alibi
score function ascore for a node r in a time slot set T as follows
ascorer (T ) =
X
t2T
r (t) (6.2)
, where r (t) =

1 if maxq2Nnr ARS!r;q(t)  
0 otherwise
r (t) is the alibi indicator function for r at time t. It indicates whether
at time slot t, a node r has an alibi correlation greater than  with a node
in Nnr. Thus, the necessary condition to identify a jammer j is
ascorer (T ) > ascorej (T ); 8r 2 Nnj (6.3)
. In other words, a node is accused if it has lowest alibi score.
Theorem 4 (Identifying non-colluding attackers) In (; )-alibi-safe topol-
ogy (  1) with a set of -jammers J = j1; : : : ; jjJ j with jamming rate
pjamj1 ; : : : ; p
jam
jjJ j , the alibi scheme can identify any attacker j 2 J if
pmaxs  2 
1  pjamj
pagg(J )
, where pagg(J ) = 1 QjJ ji=1(1  pjamji ) is the aggregated jamming rate of the
jammer set J and pmaxs is the maximum of sending probabilities of the honest
nodes (and thus, 1  pmaxs is the minimum witness probability).
Proof : Consider a set of time slots T = t1; :::; tjT j that have sending packets.
For each time slot t 2 T , a jammer j can increase its alibi point by 1
if it does not jam and at least another jammer jams. This probability is
(1  pjamj ) (1 
QjJ j
i=1;i 6=j(1  pjamji )). If j jams at time t, it is obvious that
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j = 0. Thus, the overall alibi score of j is
ascorej (T ) = jT j  (1  pjamj ) (1 
jJ jY
i=1;i6=j
(1  pjamji )):
Similarly, for the honest node r that has the highest sending probability
pmaxs , its accumulated alibi score is
ascorer (T ) = jT j  (1  pmaxs ) (1 
jJ jY
i=1
(1  pjamji )):
Substitute to the Inequality 6.3 and do some manipulations, we have
pmaxs < 1  (1  pjamj )
(1 QjJ ji=1;i 6=j(1  pjamji ))
(1 QjJ ji=1(1  pjamji )) = 2 
1  pjamj
pagg(J ) :
.
It is easy to derive following corollaries from Theorem 4.
 If there is one attacker, it will be identied as long as pmaxs < 1. Note
that pmaxs = 1 means the node always sends in any time slot.
 The above condition does not apply for pjamj = 1. However, if pjamj = 1,
it is obvious that j will be identied as long as pmaxs < 1.
 If 2   1 p
jam
j
pagg(J )  1 > pmaxS , i.e., pjamj 
QjJ j
i=1;i6=J (1 pjamji )
1+
QjJ j
i=1;i6=J (1 pjamji )
, j is also
identied regardless the value of pmaxs . Because
QjJ j
i=1;i6=J(1 pjamji )  1,
it is easy to prove that if pj > 0:5, j can also be identied regardless
the value of pmaxs .

It is easy to see that the above identication algorithm also works for alibi-
safe topologies with trusted senders. Instead of considering packet sending
events from any senders, we only consider the packet sending events from the
trusted senders.
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6.4.2 Identifying Colluding Attackers
Denition 8 (Colluding attackers) Colluding attackers are those who have
pre-shared knowledge among themselves.
Note that the denition above allows the attackers to collude through a
pre-shared knowledge only. It does not consider the case where attackers
can share new knowledge during the network operations (e.g., their proofs
of reception). However, collusion via pre-shared knowledge is a very strong
attacker model as follows. First, with pre-shared knowledge, colluding at-
tackers can agree on a content of \fake" proofs sent to the detector. In this
way, an attacker who jams is still able to get alibi correlations with the other
attackers. This collusion will help the jammers to escape from the above al-
ibi identication algorithm. In a bigger picture, with pre-shared knowledge,
the attackers can arbitrarily manipulate the alibi correlation among them-
selves. However, they cannot manipulate the alibi correlation with other
honest nodes. Second, with pre-shared knowledge, colluding attackers can
coordinate who jams which slot. That means, any two attackers will never
jam at the same time slot. In this way, the jammers never waste their jam-
ming eort. Third and last, it is possible to perform a coordinated jamming
attack to create \real" proofs as follows. At a time slot, rst jammer sends
a packet. Second jammer jams the packet of the rst sender. Thus, the rest
of jammers and honest nodes can all get real proofs and real alibi correla-
tions among each other. Even though the rst two jammers might not get
any alibi correlation3, they can get compensated later when other jammers
take turn. Apparently, this type of coordinated jamming attack can break
any alibi identication algorithms in complete alibi-safe topologies where no
senders can be trusted. Thus, we are now going to present an identication
algorithm to identify colluding attackers in alibi-safe topologies with trusted
senders. Note that in WLAN, the set of trusted nodes could be the base
station alone.
Algorithm: The basic strategy to deal with colluding attackers is to
exploit their only weakness: they cannot manipulate the alibi correlation
with other honest nodes under the jammed packets from the trusted senders
S 2 . Thus, we dene the alibi indicator function for a node r as follows.
3In fact, they may be able to get alibi correlation because both the content of sending
packet and jamming packet are known.
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~r (t) =

1 if q 2 r(N ); ARS!r;q(t)  
0 otherwise
, where r(N ) is the list of nodes in N decreasingly sorted by the correlation
with r at time t and Qk is the k-th element in r(N ). Once again, the alibi
score is dened as
~ascorer (T ) =
X
t2T
~r (t)
. Similar to the case of non-colluding attackers, an attacker j is identied if
~ascorer (T ) > ~ascorej (T ); 8r 2 Nnj
Theorem 5 (Identifying colluding attackers) In a (; ;)-alibi network
topology ( > 1) with a set of -alibi colluding jammers J = j1; : : : ; jjJ j with
the jamming target pjamT  1, the alibi scheme can identify at least one at-
tacker if pmaxsend <
pjamT
jJ j , where p
send
max = maxr2NnJ p
send
r .
Proof : With the denition of the alibi indicator function, if a jammer j
decides to make its alibi correlation with other (  1) jammers no less than
, then the -th correlation of j(N ) is a correlation with an honest node.
If j decides to make its alibi correlation with other 0 jammers (0 <   1)
no less than , the -th correlation of j(N ) is a correlation with another
jammer. However, the value of the alibi correlation is less than  and thus
~j = 0. Thus, regardless of how a jammer manipulates its alibi correlation
with other (   1) jammers, its alibi score only increases by 1 if it really
has an alibi correlation with an honest node that is no less than . This
will ensure that the collusion will not bring any advantages for the attackers
compared to other honest nodes in terms of obtaining alibi scores.
Consider an honest r. In a time slot, it obtains an alibi if the following
events happen
 r becomes a witness.
 the channel is jammed.
. The rst event happens with probability 1   psendr . The second event
happens with probability pjamT . Thus, r obtains an alibi in a time slot with
probability
(1  psendr ) pjamT (6.4)
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.Consider a jammer j with the jamming rate pmaxjam that is highest among all
attackers' jamming rates. Intuitively, j will be the one obtain least number
of alibis among the attackers due to its highest jamming rate. In a time slot,
j obtains an alibi when it becomes a witness and the channel is jammed.
Thus, j obtains an alibi in a time slot with probability
(1  pmaxjam ) pjamT (6.5)
.
Thus, to satisfy Inequality 6.3, we need
(1  psendr ) pjamT > (1  pmaxjam ) pjamT
. That means,
psendr < p
jam
max (6.6)
.
We need the condition above happens to all honest nodes. Thus,
psendmax < p
jam
max (6.7)
, where psendmax = maxr2NnJ p
send
r .
Given a jamming target pjamT and a set of J colluding attackers, it is
best for the attackers to equally jam the channel. That means, in each time
slot, with probability pT , the attackers decide to jam and with probability
1   pT they will not jam. Furthermore, the attackers will jam in a round-
robin manner to ensure that each attacker has the same jamming rate and
thus has equal chance to obtain alibis. Therefore, the condition in Eq. 6.7
becomes
psendmax <
pjamT
jJ j (6.8)

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6.5 Alibi Protocols
The identication algorithm in Section 6.4 requires the proofs to be present
at the detector. That means, every node in the network has to participate
in the detection algorithm. Nodes that do not report proofs are at risk of
being accused as attackers and receive appropriate reaction from the system
such as their removals.
Jamming detection: Because sending proofs incurs overhead to nodes, the
base station only collects proofs when there is a jamming attack. To detect
the presence of jamming attacks, we use a similar detection techniques pro-
posed in [3]. For the uplink trac (i.e., from nodes to the base station), a
jamming attack is declared if the base station receives a signicant number
of corrupted packets with strong received signal strength. For the unicast
downlink trac, the base station declares the presence of jamming attacks
after getting a signicant number of sending packets without receiving ac-
knowledgements.
 Step 1: Once the base station detects a jamming attack, it starts a
proof-collection period of Tcollect in which it starts to broadcast \test"
packets at random intervals. The content of the test packets are uni-
formly drawn from the message space, i.e., each bit in the content is
uniformly drawn from f0; 1g. The uniform randomness ensures that
the attacker can only have a blind guess on the content. Note that
each honest node always maintains proofs in the latest window interval
of Tcollect. At the end of the proof-collection period, the base station
broadcasts a proof-exchange message.
 Step 2: When nodes receive the proof-exchange message from the base
station, they immediately start sending the proofs that they have just
collected in the last Tcollect time interval to the base station.
 Step 3: After receiving proofs from nodes collected in the last Tcollect
time interval, the base station starts the identication algorithm based
on the set of time slots in which it sent \test" packets. It removes any
identied attackers. After that if there is still jamming attack going
on, it repeats Step 1.
All messages between nodes and the base station are transmitted using
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BBC-based timing channel. The BBC-based timing communication relies
on the timing pattern of sending packets to convey the actual message. It
has a strong resistance to reactive jamming attacks and allows concurrent
transmissions of multiple senders. One major disadvantage of this timing
channel is its low throughput. More details are discussed in Section 6.6.
To cope with the low throughput nature of the BBC-based jamming-
resistant timing-channel on which proofs are exchanged, the alibi framework
compresses the proofs using a hashing technique called \similarity preserving
hashing" (or locality sensitive hashing). Unlike other hashing techniques such
as MD5 or SHA-1, similarity hash functions have a special property that the
Hamming distance of hash values of two objects is proportional to their
original Hamming distance. Therefore, instead of storing and exchanging
the raw packet content, each node only needs to keep the hash version of
proofs to reduce the storage and communication overhead. Section 6.7 will
give more details.
6.6 BBC-based Timing Channel
In the framework, we need a jamming-resistant timing channel between the
nodes and the base station. We use the technique mentioned in Section 3.5.1.
BBC is a keyless jamming-resistant broadcast communication proposed
in [19]. The basic idea is to have the sender create \indelible" marks in an
additive-OR channel to convey a sending message. The receiver receives a
\packet" containing all the marks and decodes the original sending message.
Indelible marks in the additive-OR channel have an important property: the
jammers cannot erase the existence of the marks in the channel; they can
only create extra marks. Therefore, a received BBC packet may contain more
marks than those created by the senders. In other words, the set of marks
in the received BBC packet is the super-set of the marks created by senders.
Thus, the coding scheme is called concurrent code and BBC code is the only
known implementation of the concurrent code.
There are several ways to create an additive-OR channel [19]. In the
alibi framework, we build a pulse-based channel from the data channel. A
pulse is 4-byte preamble-only packet. Multiple pulses sent at the same time
results in only one single pulse. In this way, this pulse-based channel is
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an additive-OR channel. For BBC code, a pulse is also an indelible mark.
Reactive jammers cannot erase marks because they jam only after sensing
the preambles4. In addition, concurrent sending of multiple marks will result
in only one mark. Therefore, the BBC-based timing channel built in this way
is not only robust to the reactive jammers but also allows multiple concurrent
message transmissions.
A message M of length n bits is encoded into a message M 0 of length
m = ne, where e is the expansion factor (e > 1). Denote (m; i) the rst
i bits of message m and a hash function H (e.g., MD5 or SHA1). For each
i 2 (1; n), we calculate the location L(i) of the i-th mark corresponding to bit
i as L(i) = H((m; i)) mod m. Therefore, the message M is encoded into
n marks whose locations are from 0::m. The encoded message M 0 will then
be transmitted in m slots. The marked slots correspond to transmissions of
a pulse (i.e., a preamble-only packet). The unmarked slot is equivalent to no
transmission.
The receiver receives a packet of length m containing at least n marks.
The packet may have more than n marks due to either multiple messages
sent or extra marks by jammers. The decoding process guarantees to decode
any messages contained in the packet. It maintains a tree of maximum depth
n rooted by an empty message. At the depth level 1, if the location at (H(0)
mod m) is marked, 0 is added into the tree. Similarly, if the location of
(H(1) mod m) is marked, 1 is added into the tree. Recursively, at each node
at level i with the corresponding message of length i Mi, if (H(Mib) mod m)
(b = 0; 1) is marked in the packet, b is added as a child of the node. The tree
keeps growing until the level n. Any nodes at level n correspond to decoded
messages of length n.
Even though the decoding process guarantees to decode any messages
contained in the packet, it also decodes extra messages, referred to as \hal-
lucination". To control the number of hallucination messages, a checksum
sequence containing l 0-bits is added into the original message. Furthermore,
to control the width of the decoding tree, s bits are inserted in every f bits
in the original message. We leave the detailed analysis of these parameters
to the original paper [19].
4In fact, even if the attackers jam the preambles, it is still possible to detect the jammed
preambles. However, the preamble detection has to rely on the energy detection rather
than the preamble signature.
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It is important to emphasize that there is a critical threshold on the num-
ber of concurrent transmissions below which all concurrent transmission are
highly successful and above which no concurrent transmission are successful.
This critical threshold implies a trade-o between the maximum number of
successful concurrent transmissions and the transmission length of the mes-
sages. Specically, to have n nodes sending a message of b bits concurrently
with high successful rate, the transmission length has to be O(n b). Figure
6.5(a) shows the performance of the BBC-based timing channel in which the
maximum number of concurrent transmissions is targeted at 10. As shown
in the Figure 6.5(a), there is a sharp decrease of the successful transmis-
sion probability (y-axis) from 0:95 to 0:2 when the number of concurrent
transmission (x-axis) approaches 10 and goes beyond. Figure 6.5(b) further
shows the transmission length (y-axis) versus the targeted maximum number
of concurrent transmissions (x-axis).
It is important to emphasize that the proof transmission using BBC in
Step 2 of the alibi protocol is not encrypted. If in Step 2, a jammer decides
to listen for some proofs, which takes a signicant time, and start the proof
transmission to the BS, the start of its proof transmission period will be
signicantly late compared to any other nodes and can easily be detected by
the BS.
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6.7 Similarity Hashing (SimHash) & Alibi
Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) is a popular technique used in informa-
tion retrieval to detect near-duplicate documents [27]. Essentially, LSH is a
method of performing probabilistic dimension reduction of high-dimensional
data. The basic idea is to hash high-dimension input objects so that similar
objects are mapped into the same buckets with high probability. In other
words, input objects are hashed such that their similarities are preserved in
the hash space. This similarity-preserving property is completely opposite
to normal hashing techniques (e.g., SHA1 or MD5), where a small dierence
of inputs might lead to a completely dierent hash outputs. Formally, a lo-
cality sensitive hashing scheme is a distribution on a family F operating on
a collection of objects, such that for two objects x; y,
Prh2F [h(x) = h(y)] = similarity(x; y)
, where similarity(x; y) 2 [0; 1] is the similarity function dened on the
collection of objects.
In the alibi framework, a similarity hashing function F is used to hash the
packet content. That means, the correlation of two packet content B1; B2 will
be calculated as correlation(B1; B2) = 1 H(F(B1);F(B2))l , where F(B1);F(B2)
is the similarity hash of the packet content B1; B2.
There are several techniques to implement F such as random sampling
[28], min-wise independent permutation [29], random projection [27] or stable
distribution [30]. In the alibi framework, we choose the random projection
technique, also referred to as simhash, proposed by Charikar [27] due to
its simple and ecient implementation [31]. The random projection method
of the similarity preserving hashing is designed to approximate the cosine
distance between vectors. The basic idea of this technique is to choose a
random hyperplane (dened by a normal unit vector ~r) at the outset and
use the hyperplane to hash input vectors. Formally, we let h(~v) = sgn(~v ~r),
i.e., h(~v) = 1 depending on which side of the hyperplane ~v lies. Therefore,
each possible choice of r results in a binary output. If we choose the vector
~r t times uniformly, we will have a t-bit output of vector ~v. For any two
vectors ~u;~v, the bits of two t-bit outputs match with probability proportional
to the cosine of the angle between them. In [27], the author proves that
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Pr[hr(~u) = hr(~v)] = 1  (~u;~v) , where  is the angle of vectors ~u and ~v.
The point of using simhash is to reduce the amount of data needed
for storing and transmitting proofs. For example, a 32-byte packet content
can be sim-hashed into a 2-byte ngerprint while still preserving reasonable
accuracy of the similarity with other packet content. Figure 6.6 shows the ac-
curacy of 2-byte sim-hash for a 32-byte vector. Two 32-byte vectors sampled
uniformly are sim-hashed. The plot shows the correlation of original 32-byte
vectors (i.e., X-axis) and the correlation of the 2-byte sim-hash values (i.e.,
Y-axis).
6.8 Evaluation
6.8.1 Evaluation of Alibi-safe Topologies
There is a strong connection between alibi-safe topologies and physical topolo-
gies. Thus, it is important to determine whether a given physical topology
is an alibi-safe topology. Because alibi-safe topology only relies on the re-
ceived signal strength, we need to assume a propagation model in order to
calculate RSSI from the sending power. In this evaluation, we assume a log-
normal shadowing path-loss model. In the log-normal shadowing path-loss
model, PR = PS   PL(d), where PL(d) = PL(d0) + 10pl log10 dd0 + N is
the path-loss of the radio over a distance d; PR is the power of the signal
at the receiver; PS is the power of signal at the sender; d0 is the reference
distance and PL(d0) is the power decay for this distance; pl is the signal
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Figure 6.7: Physical topologies vs. Alibi-safe topologies
79
decay factor. N is the zero-mean Gaussian (in db) with standard deviation
 representing the multi-path eects.
To test whether a given physical topology is an (; )-alibi-safe topology
under a set of senders , we perform following steps. First, for each sender
S in , we calculate the RSSI at each receiver for the message sent by S.
We use the correlation table constructed in the experiments described in
Section 6.3 to determine whether two receivers are -neighbor. Then, for
each receiver, we count the number of -neighbors. If any receiver has less
than  -neighbors under the sender S, the topology is not (; )-alibi-safe
topology.
We perform the alibi-safe test for three types of physical topology in a
20m 20m square: star topology, grid topology and random topology where
the set  only has the trusted base station located at the center of the square.
Figure 6.7 shows the results of the alibi-safe tests for the network size from
10 to 100. The x-axis is the  value and the y-axis is the minimum number
of -neighbors for every node (i.e ). That means, each point represents a
possible (; )-alibi-safe topology. For star topology where nodes surround
the base station, there is high chance for a node to have alibi neighbors as
shown in Figure 6.7(a). For grid topology, it is less alibi-safe as shown in
Figure 6.7(b) because nodes have dierent distance to the base station. The
alibi-safe of random topologies really depends on network density as shown
in Figure 6.7(c).
In terms of robustness to colluding attackers, star topologies are the
strongest. In a star topology, each node has roughly 30% of other nodes
as its 0:55-neighbors. For grid topologies and random topologies, these num-
bers are around 15% and 7%, respectively.
6.8.2 Evaluation of alibi on TOSSIM Simulator
We use TOSSIM as our network simulator for a large-scale evaluation of the
alibi framework. TOSSIM does not assume any radio propagation model;
instead, it provides a radio abstraction between two-node communication.
Specically, it derives the packet error rate based on the empirical RSSI.
Furthermore, it also has a more accurate noise generator using Close Pattern
Matching (CPM) algorithm on a given noise traces. In our simulation, the
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Parameter Values
Number of nodes n = [10  40]
Number of attackers [1  9]
Jamming rate [0:1  1:0]
Value for -neighbors  = 0:55
 0.05
Simulation time 1000 seconds
BBC maximum number of concurrent transmissions 50
BBC message length in time 4s
Number of BBC messages per proof-exchange period 10
Number of bits for simhash 16 bits
Table 6.1: Simulation parameters
noise trace is the one obtained from the experiments described in Section 6.3.
Because TOSSIM does not provide the correlation of packet contents under
reactive jamming attacks, we add that feature at the physical layer using
the correlation table obtained from the experiments in Section 6.3. BBC-
based timing channel is implemented at the MAC layer in TOSSIM and is
transparent to the application layer.
There are two alibi protocols: the Omniscient protocol (OMS) and the
Alibi-BBC-Simhash protocol (ABS). The Omniscient protocol is the optimal
protocol because it assumes every proof is available immediately at the cen-
tral detector right after its creation. The ABS protocol uses the BBC-based
timing channel and simhash.
We evaluate the two alibi protocols under three types of topologies: star
topology, grid topology and random topology in a square of 20m 20m and
two types of attackers: non-colluding and colluding attackers. We vary the
simulation parameters as shown in Table 6.1. We obtain the detection accu-
racy (i.e., the detection probability and the false alarm rate), the detection
time, the network performance and the network overhead. However, due to
the space limit, we only show the results for the star topology.
Detection accuracy: Figure 6.8 shows the detection accuracy of the ABS
protocol under non-colluding jamming attacks and colluding jamming at-
tacks. Specically, Figures 6.8(a) and 6.8(b) show the detection accuracy for
non-colluding attackers using the same jamming rate of 0:2. It is shown that
as the number of attackers increases, the detection probability decreases.
This is because when the network has more attackers, the chance for an
attacker to get alibis by the jamming actions of the other attackers also in-
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crease. It is shown that as the network size increases from 10 to 40, the
detection probability increases. This is because the larger network size in-
creases the number of -neighbors and makes the attackers busier to jam.
The gures also show that the false alarm rate remains similar under dierent
network sizes and number of attackers. This shows the expected behavior
of the proposed outlier detection technique. We also obtain the results for
dierent  but do not plot them here. Essentially, larger value of  will lead
to lower false alarms but also lower detection probability. Figures 6.8(c) and
6.8(d) show the detection accuracy for colluding attackers who collude and
coordinate to target at 100% jamming rate. The trends are similar to the
case of the non-colluding case. However, the detection probability is slightly
worse compared to the non-colluding cases. This is due to the fact that 1)
colluding jammers need to jam less than non-colluding jammers for the same
aggregated jamming target and 2) each node needs more -neighbors than
the non-colluding case.
Figure 6.9 shows the detection performance of ABS protocol against the
OMS protocol for n = 40. ABS protocol has a gap of around 0:2  0:3 to the
OMS protocol. This is because the nodes cannot send all the proofs to the
central detector due to the low throughput of the timing channel.
Packet error rate: Figure 6.10 shows the packet error rate of the non-
colluding and colluding attackers. As shown in Figure 6.10, with the same
jamming rate of 0:2, having more non-colluding attackers only increases the
packet error rate sub-linearly. In contrast, colluding attackers can coordinate
to achieve 100% jamming. This shows the danger of colluding attackers over
the non-colluding attackers.
Detection Time: Figure 6.11 shows the detection time for the case of non-
colluding and colluding attackers. As shown in the gures, as the number of
jammer increases, it takes longer time to identify them. The explanation is
similar to the detection probability.
6.9 Discussions
The proposed design of the receiving-based alibi framework has the following
advantages.
 It can work on current CSMA/CA wireless LANs.
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Figure 6.10: Packer error rate of the ABS protocol
84
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 700
 800
 900
 1000
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
D
et
ec
tio
n 
Ti
m
e 
(s)
#Jammers
n=10
n=20
n=30
n=40
(a) Non-colluding attackers
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 700
 800
 900
 1000
 2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
D
et
ec
tio
n 
Ti
m
e 
(s)
#Colluding Jammers
n=10
n=20
n=30
n=40
(b) Colluding attackers
Figure 6.11: Detection time of ABS protocol
 It can deal with both multiple non-colluding and colluding attackers.
 It is a reactive defense strategy. That means, it is only activated when
the attackers are present in the system. Once the attackers are removed,
the alibi scheme will not incur any overhead.
However, it also has the following disadvantages.
 The current design of the framework cannot deal with the attackers
which can exchange the information during the network operation.
 It cannot defend against the hybrid attacks of colluding attacks and
sybil attacks in which one attacker sends the proof on behalf of the
other jamming attacker.
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CHAPTER 7
RELATED WORK
7.1 Jamming Attacks and Defenses
Jamming attacks
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Figure 7.1: Ontology of jamming attacks
There has been plethora body of research work on jamming attacks [32]
[2, 7, 33, 10, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 9, 43] . Figure 7.1 shows
an ontology of jamming attacks with representative works. Jamming at-
tacks can be classied as proactive or reactive. In the proactive jamming
strategy, the attacker jams the channel without caring about the on-going
communication. A typical example of this type is the continuous jamming
[33, 2]. This strategy is the simplest way to perform a jamming attack.
However, it is not energy-ecient due to the continuous jamming activity.
This also makes the attacker easy to detect. Reactive jamming strategy
[38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 9, 43, 2, 7], in contrast, avoids these drawbacks by intelli-
gently listening and jamming the channel. In this strategy, the attacker keeps
listening and only jams \important" packets such as control packets [43][44].
Corrupted control packets can drastically reduce the eective throughput of
the communication channel [43][44]. The reactive jamming attack is usually
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Figure 7.2: Ontology of jamming defenses
more complicated than the proactive jamming attack due to the stealthy
nature of the attacker.
Due to the dangers of various jamming attacks, jamming defenses have
gained much attention from researchers [45, 46, 47, 48, 49]. Figure 7.2 shows
an ontology of jamming attacks with representative works. One of the most
eective jamming mitigation is the spread spectrum technique. By hopping
the carrier frequency (frequency-hopping spread spectrum - FHSS) or spread-
ing its signal in time (direct-sequence spread spectrum - DSSS), the network
can force the jammer to spend several-fold more power than if spread spec-
trum were not used [50][7]. However, spread spectrum does not work if the
jammer knows the hopping-pattern (HP) of the FHSS or the pseudo-noise
chip (PN) sequence of DSSS. Once the attacker knows such knowledge, he
can jam the channel very eectively. For example, in 802.11 DSSS the PN
is a common knowledge and the attacker can easily obtain it [8]. By just
using the COTS 802.11 cards, the attacker can easily modify the rmware
to have an eective 802.11 jammer [2]. That said, the \outsider" attack
(i.e., no knowledge of the HP or PN) can be defended eectively with spread
spectrum technology while the \insider" attack is still a problem.
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Indeed, dealing with the insider jamming attacks, where the \shared se-
cret" such as shared HP or PN is compromised, is a challenging problem.
This problem exists not only in the spread spectrum technology but also in
other wireless technologies such as Ultra-wide band (UWB) (pulse-pattern
as the shared secret)[50][19]. Unfortunately, there have been few research
results on this topic. These research results share the view of considering
shared secret as a type of \shared key" among all nodes. From this point
of view, dealing with a compromised shared key is similar to the key man-
agement in the traditional security literature. Specically, hierarchical key
management and asymmetrical key schemes have been explored in [5] and
[19]. In [5], the authors extend the idea from the well-known hierarchical
key management to eliminate the compromised shared secret. However, this
scheme is designed only for the wireless broadcast network where the base
station can send/receive on dierent channels at the same time. In [19],
the authors propose a concurrent coding scheme to form a communication
primitive under jamming condition. This can be used as a way to setup a
shared key from the asymmetric key by using some techniques like Die-
Hellman [51]. This scheme, however, is only applicable for point-to-point
communication.
7.2 Detecting Mis-behaving/Compromised Nodes
There has been also work related to detecting mis-behaving nodes in the
network. In many ways, insider jammers can also be considered as malicious
nodes. For example, a misbehaving node may intentionally to send packets
to collide with legitimate packets from other nodes. Pioneer work on this
topic was rst proposed in [44]. After that, there has been many follow-up
works on this topic [52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57]. Essentially, the literature can be
classied into two categories: 1) detecting mis-behaving nodes and applying
certain penalties to the mis-behaving nodes, and 2) preventing/discouraging
mis-behaving nodes by modifying the existing MAC protocols or proposing
new design of MAC protocols.
Detecting mis-behaving nodes is possible with the cooperation from hon-
est nodes. The rst set of detection schemes provides solutions based on the
modication of existing IEEE 802.11. For example, in [44], the proposed
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scheme assumes a trusted receiver that assigns back-o value to nodes, or a
negotiation of the back-o value among the nodes [52]. Because the back-o
values are known to the detector, the mis-behaviors are easy to detect.
In the second set of detection schemes, the detection is done without any
modications to the existing MAC protocols. These schemes are more prac-
tical to deploy. However, the detection is much more challenging because
each node selects the back-o values independently. Thus, the detector can-
not determine with complete certainty whether the deviating behaviors of
a node are caused by chances or by real deviations. In DOMINO [54], the
detection algorithm estimates the average back-o time, and raise an alarm
if the estimation is suspiciously low. In [55], the authors propose to use the
inter-delivery time distribution instead of the back-o times of the nodes. By
using the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT), the authors estimate a
normal inter-delivery distribution and an attack inter-delivery distribution.
A more robust SPRT approach was proposed in [53]. The scheme basically
addresses the detection of adaptive intelligent cheaters by using the min-max
robust detection framework.
When honest noes behave selshly, preventing/discouraging mis-behaving
nodes can be done by game-theoretic ideas [58][59][60]. In the game-theoretic
settings, nodes are assumed to be selsh and try to maximize their access to
the medium. The goal of the protocol is to motivate users to achieve a Nash
equilibrium in which no nodes want to deviate from the protocol. However,
due to the assumption that all nodes are willing to deviate from the protocol,
the throughput achieved is substantially less than in the protocols where
honest nodes cooperate in the design.
7.3 System-level Fault Diagnosis
System-level fault diagnosis has been an active research area after the pioneer
work by Preparata et al. [61], referred to as PMC model. The fundamental
assumption in system-level diagnosis is that one node may be able to test
single or multiple node(s). The outcome of a test can be either \faulty" or
\fault-free". Specically, a fault-free node can correctly diagnose another
node as fault-free (or faulty) if the diagnosed node is fault-free (or faulty).
However, the test performed by a faulty node is unreliable. Given a set of the
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outcome of the tests (a.k.a \syndrome"), modeled as a graph whose vertices
are nodes and edges are the test outcomes, the system can identify some
or all faulty nodes. There has been plethora of work in system-level fault
diagnosis [62, 63, 64, 65, 61, 66, 67]. Interested readers can start exploring
this topic from an excellent survey in [68][69].
PMC mode and its variations are known as invalidation models. A sec-
ond approach, known as the comparison model, has been introduced indepen-
dently by Malek [70] (a.k.a asymmetric comparison model) and by Hakimi
and Chwa [71] (a.k.a symmetric comparison model). In comparison mod-
els, a pair of nodes will be assigned to execute an identical test job. The
agreements and disagreements among the nodes are the basis for identifying
the set of faulty nodes. In both models, it is assumed that two fault-free
nodes give matching test results while a faulty and a fault-free node give
the mismatching results. The dierence in the two models is the test out-
come of two faulty nodes. In the symmetric model, both test outcomes are
possible (i.e., matching and mis-matching outcome), while in the asymmet-
ric model two faulty nodes always give the mis-matching test output. The
comparison models are then extended to into Meang/Malek (MM) model
[72], which later on was generalized into \generalized comparison model" by
Sengupta and Dahbura [73]. Blough and Brown proposed the \broadcast
comparison model" [74], in which two tested nodes broadcast their results
to all other nodes. Chessa and Santi further applied the comparison-based
model system-level diagnosis approach to ad-hoc networks [75].
Alibi, in some senses, shares several common characteristics with system-
level fault diagnosis. They both consider the problem of identifying faulty/mis-
behaving nodes with the assumption that fault-free/honest nodes are will-
ing to cooperate. They also specify the necessary condition to identify
faulty/mis-behaving nodes where the system can identify all faulty/mis-
behaving nodes (i.e., one-step diagnosis) or one-by-one (i.e., sequential di-
agnosis). The comparison model has similar approach with receiving-based
alibis. They both have a comparator test a pair of nodes and identify
faulty/comprimised nodes based on the outcome of the test outcomes. How-
ever, alibi and system-level fault diagnosis have several fundamental dier-
ences.
 The fault model is dierent. In system-level fault diagnosis, the fault
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can be hard or soft. In alibi, compromised nodes adversely avoid get-
ting identied by exploiting the knowledge of the protocols used in the
system.
 In system-level diagnosis, one important assumption is that a fault-
free node can correctly and reliably test the faulty node. In the current
design of alibis, this assumption does not hold.
 In broadcast comparison model whose model is closest to receiving-
based alibi only considers asymmetric comparison model. In alibi,
the asymmetric comparison model does not hold because attackers can
share alibis and thus yield the same test result.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
8.1 Concluding Remarks
Dealing with insider attackers is always challenging because the attackers
have the inside knowledge of the system. Most of the approaches to identi-
fying insider attackers is to collect \malicious" behaviors of the nodes. How-
ever, such approach does not work if the attackers can manage to perform
the attacks without revealing their identities. The insider jamming attacks
presented in this dissertation is an example. A jammer can use reactive jam-
ming attacks to corrupt the packets of other nodes in the network without
revealing its identity.
To identify insider jammers, we propose a novel approach in which the
system collects alibis of nodes to infer compromised nodes that perform re-
active jamming attacks. The approach is complementary to the existing
approaches because the system collects \good" behaviors of nodes instead of
\malicious" behaviors.
We conclude the main contributions of this dissertation as follows.
 We present novel alibi frameworks for identifying insider jammers in
single-hop wireless networks. The basic idea is to exploit the half-
duplex nature of the jammers in which they cannot do both send and
receive at the same time. Thus, if a node can present a proof showing
that it is sending or receiving a packet while there is a jamming activity
at the same time, it can prove that it cannot be the jammer at that time
(i.e., it has an alibi). We expand the alibi framework into sending-based
alibis and receiving-based alibis. The sending-based alibis rely on the
fact that the jammers cannot send in two channels simultaneously while
receiving-based alibis rely on the fact that the jammers cannot receive
when they are sending. We also present alibi algorithms, protocols and
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jamming-resistant communication that can be used in any instance of
the alibi framework.
 We present three specic designs of the alibi framework including algo-
rithms, protocols and architectures for three dierent types of networks:
multi-channel WLANs, single-channel WLANs and multi-channel ad-
hoc networks. The designs specically show how S-alibis and R-alibis
are used to facilitate the identication process in dierent networks.
Specically, for multi-channel WLANs, we propose the usage a hy-
brid of sending-based alibis and receiving-based alibis (Chapter 4). For
single-channel WLANs and multi-channel ad hoc networks, we propose
the usage of receiving-based alibis (Chapter 5 and 6). The analyt-
ical results, simulation results and experimental results conrm the
hypothesis that a jammer can be identied when its jamming prob-
ability exceeds certain threshold. The threshold is a function of the
sending/receiving rates of other nodes and and the jamming rates of
other attackers.
8.2 Limitations
The current designs of the alibi framework have several limitations. First, the
alibi framework may have signicant communication overhead for exchanging
alibis in the network. To reduce the communication overhead, we proposed
that each alibi framework should have 1) a reactive defense mechanism in
which the proofs and alibis are exchanged only when the jamming attacks
are detected and 2) a mechanism to compress proofs and alibis.
Second, the sending-based alibi framework presented in Chapter 4 has
a strong assumption: it requires all honest nodes to have non-zero sending
rate. If a node does not have anything to send, it will be accused as an
attacker. This limitation is due to the nature of sending-based alibis: alibis
are granted based on the sending actions of nodes.
Third and last, the design of receiving-based alibi framework presented
in Chapter 6 cannot cope with colluding attackers that share the corrupted
packets among themselves. This limitation is due to the property of receiving-
based alibis: corrupted proofs cannot be authenticated and thus can be
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shared arbitrarily.
8.3 Future Directions
There are several future directions based on this work.
 Defending against colluding attacks and Sybil attacks : Receiving-based
alibis still have some problems with the colluding and Sybil attacks.
Defending against these attacks will make receiving-based alibis much
stronger.
 Decentralized detection. The current alibi framework relies on a trusted
central detector. One major goal will be to decentralize the detection
process.
 Multi-hop networks. The dissertation mainly considers the single-hop
wireless networks. Extending the alibi framework to multi-hop wire-
less networks is important. However, jamming defense in multi-hop
wireless networks will be challenging. First, a jammer may have dier-
ent jamming area in the network which makes the identication more
complicated. Second, the jammers may block any particular routing
process to prevent the alibi-exchange among nodes. The design of the
alibi framework will need to take these factors into account.
 Large-scale test-bed. The dissertation has experiments on small scale
test-bed. Alibi framework evaluation on large-scale networks is done
through simulation. It is very interesting to see the alibi framework on
a large-scale test-bed.
 System-level fault diagnosis and alibis : There might be connections
between system-level fault diagnosis and alibis. If alibi is dened prop-
erly, a lot of results in system-level fault diagnosis can be applicable to
alibis.
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